Terry v. Ohio
392 U.S. 1 (1968)
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Rule of Law:
When a police officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, the officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop. If the officer also has a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a limited pat-down of the person's outer clothing for weapons.
Facts:
- Cleveland Police Detective Martin McFadden, a 39-year veteran officer, observed John W. Terry and Richard Chilton on a downtown street corner.
- Over a period of 10-12 minutes, McFadden watched the men repeatedly walk a specific route, pause to stare into the same store window, and then confer with each other at the corner.
- The men repeated this ritual approximately a dozen times in total.
- At one point, a third man, Katz, approached Terry and Chilton, spoke with them briefly, and then walked away.
- Sometime later, Terry and Chilton walked off and rejoined Katz a couple of blocks away.
- Believing the men were casing the store for a robbery and that they might be armed, McFadden approached them.
- After McFadden identified himself and the men mumbled in response to his questions, he grabbed Terry, spun him around, and patted down his outer clothing.
- McFadden felt a pistol in Terry's overcoat pocket, which he then removed. He also found a revolver on Chilton after patting him down.
Procedural Posture:
- Terry filed a pretrial motion to suppress the seized revolvers in the Ohio trial court (Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County).
- The trial court denied the motion, ruling the stop and frisk was reasonable for the officer's protection.
- Following a bench trial, the court adjudged Terry guilty of carrying a concealed weapon.
- Terry (appellant) appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial District, Cuyahoga County, which affirmed the conviction.
- Terry (appellant) then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that no 'substantial constitutional question' was involved.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Terry's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a 'stop and frisk' of a person by a police officer, based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause, violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Warren
No. A 'stop and frisk' based on reasonable suspicion does not violate the Fourth Amendment. A 'stop' is a seizure and a 'frisk' is a search, and they are therefore subject to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. However, the warrant and probable cause requirements are not always applicable to brief, on-the-street encounters. The Court must balance the governmental interest in crime prevention and officer safety against the individual's right to be free from unreasonable intrusion. To justify a stop, an officer must be able to point to 'specific and articulable facts' which, taken together with rational inferences, reasonably warrant that intrusion. To justify a subsequent frisk, the officer must have reason to believe the individual is armed and dangerous. In this case, Detective McFadden's detailed observations of Terry's behavior provided a reasonable suspicion to investigate, and the nature of the suspected crime (robbery) made it reasonable to fear the men were armed, thus justifying the protective pat-down for weapons.
Concurring - Justice Harlan
No. The frisk was constitutional. It is critical to note that the officer's right to conduct a protective frisk for weapons is contingent upon the constitutionality of the initial forcible stop. An officer must first have reasonable grounds to make an investigatory stop. Once a forcible stop is justified based on an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence, the right to frisk for weapons becomes 'immediate and automatic' to ensure the officer's safety, as there is no reason the officer should have to ask a question and risk the answer being a bullet.
Concurring - Justice White
No. The search was permissible. When an officer is justified in making an investigatory stop, the Constitution does not prevent the officer from asking pertinent questions. While the detained person is not obligated to answer, and refusal to answer does not provide grounds for arrest, the temporary detention justified by the circumstances is what primarily supports the protective frisk. The ability to briefly detain and question a suspicious person is a key element of the investigative process that justifies the accompanying safety measures.
Dissenting - Justice Douglas
Yes. A 'stop and frisk' without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. The majority's decision creates a new, lower standard of 'reasonable suspicion' that is not found in the Constitution, which demands 'probable cause' for any search or seizure. This ruling gives police officers greater authority to search and seize than a magistrate has to issue a warrant. To allow searches on grounds less than probable cause is a long step down the 'totalitarian path' that erodes the protections of the Fourth Amendment and leaves citizens' liberty at the discretion of the police.
Analysis:
Terry v. Ohio is a landmark decision that established the 'stop and frisk' doctrine, creating a significant exception to the Fourth Amendment's probable cause and warrant requirements. By introducing the 'reasonable suspicion' standard, the Court provided law enforcement with a crucial tool for on-the-street crime prevention and officer safety. This decision profoundly expanded police authority for temporary, investigative detentions, but also attempted to limit that authority by requiring that the suspicion be 'articulable' and that the scope of the search be strictly limited to a pat-down for weapons. The case continues to be central to debates over policing, privacy, and racial profiling.
