Terrell v. State
86 Tenn. 523 (1888)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Tennessee mayhem statute, a specific intent to inflict the particular maiming injury is not a necessary element of the offense; a general malicious intent to do harm is sufficient.
Facts:
- Neel Terrell and James Wilson were involved in an altercation.
- At the time of the altercation, Wilson had sight in only one of his eyes.
- Terrell struck Wilson in his sighted eye with a half of a brick.
- The blow from the brick put out Wilson's remaining eye, rendering him totally blind.
- Terrell admitted to striking Wilson with the brick.
Procedural Posture:
- Neel Terrell was charged with the crime of mayhem in an indictment.
- At trial in the Circuit Court (the court of first instance), the judge instructed the jury that a general malicious intent was sufficient for a conviction.
- The trial judge refused Terrell's request to instruct the jury that a specific intent to put out the prosecutor's eye was a necessary element of the crime.
- A jury found Terrell guilty of mayhem and he was sentenced to two years in the penitentiary.
- Terrell (plaintiff in error) appealed his conviction to the Tennessee Supreme Court, arguing that the trial judge's refusal to give the requested jury instruction was reversible error.
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Issue:
Does the crime of mayhem, under the controlling Tennessee statute, require proof that the defendant had a specific intent to inflict the particular maiming injury that occurred?
Opinions:
Majority - Caldwell, J.
No. The crime of mayhem under the Tennessee statute does not require a specific intent to inflict the particular maiming injury that occurred. The court reasoned that while earlier mayhem statutes, like the English Coventry Act, contained language requiring an 'intention in so doing to maim or disfigure,' the controlling Tennessee Act of 1829 deliberately omitted this language. The current statute only requires that the act be done 'unlawfully and maliciously.' Citing Wright v. The State, the court defined malice not as a specific animosity toward the victim, but as 'an evil design in general, a wicked and corrupt motive, an intention to do evil.' The law presumes this general malice from the unlawful act itself, and thus, a specific intent to cause the particular maiming is not a required element of the crime.
Dissenting - Turney, C. J. and Snodgrass, J.
No written opinion was provided. The judges noted their non-concurrence.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the mens rea (mental state) required for the crime of mayhem in Tennessee, significantly lowering the burden of proof for the prosecution. By eliminating the need to prove specific intent, the court prevents defendants from arguing they intended a lesser harm than the maiming that resulted. The ruling solidifies that a general malicious state of mind is sufficient, effectively applying a form of transferred intent where the general intent to do harm transfers to the specific, more serious result. This interpretation makes convictions for mayhem more attainable in cases arising from general violent altercations where a specific maiming was not necessarily premeditated.
