Tenneco Oil Co. v. Templin
201 Ga. App. 30, 410 S.E.2d 154, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1189 (1991)
Rule of Law:
A claim for contribution against a co-plaintiff is not a compulsory counterclaim because it does not mature until judgment is rendered, and a claim for contribution against a co-defendant is not a compulsory cross-claim because the relevant statute is permissive, thereby allowing a party to pursue a separate action for contribution after the underlying tort judgment.
Facts:
- Appellee Douglas Lynn Bullman and the woman who later became his wife were injured in a multi-car collision involving a vehicle driven by an employee of appellant Tenneco Oil Company and another vehicle driven by appellee Barbara Gay Templin.
- In the subsequent tort action, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the wife against both Tenneco and Templin, awarding her $400,000 in damages.
- The jury also found that Mr. Bullman’s negligence contributed to his wife’s injuries.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Templin on her counterclaim for contribution against Mr. Bullman.
- After the verdict was reduced as a result of settlement with other defendants, judgment was entered in favor of the wife for $393,000.
- Tenneco and Templin each satisfied one-half of the $393,000 judgment.
- Templin was awarded a judgment of $98,250 against Mr. Bullman on her contribution claim, effectively resulting in Templin and Mr. Bullman each satisfying one-fourth of the total judgment.
- As a result, Tenneco had satisfied one-half of the judgment, while Templin and Mr. Bullman each satisfied one-fourth.
Procedural Posture:
- Douglas Lynn Bullman and his future wife sued Tenneco Oil Company, Tenneco's employee, and Barbara Gay Templin (among others) in a tort action for injuries sustained in a multi-car collision.
- During the tort action, Templin filed a counterclaim against Mr. Bullman for contribution if she was found liable for his wife’s injuries.
- A jury in the tort action returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs against both Tenneco and Templin, awarding damages to Mrs. Bullman.
- The jury also found Mr. Bullman negligent and returned a verdict for Templin on her contribution counterclaim against him.
- After reduction due to settlements, judgment was entered for Mrs. Bullman.
- Shortly after the judgment in the tort action, Tenneco filed a new, separate contribution action against Templin and Bullman.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Templin and Bullman in the contribution action.
- The trial court denied Tenneco's motion for summary judgment in the contribution action.
- Tenneco appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Templin and Bullman.
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Issue:
1. Is a defendant's claim for contribution against a co-plaintiff for damages awarded to another co-plaintiff a compulsory counterclaim, such that failure to assert it in the original tort action bars a separate contribution action? 2. Is a defendant's claim for contribution against a co-defendant barred by res judicata if not brought as a cross-claim in the original tort action?
Opinions:
Majority - Pope, Judge
No, a claim for contribution against a co-plaintiff is not a compulsory counterclaim, and no, a claim for contribution against a co-defendant is not a compulsory cross-claim. The court first addressed Tenneco's claim against Mr. Bullman, which Bullman argued was a compulsory counterclaim under OCGA § 9-11-13 (a). While agreeing that Tenneco's contribution claim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as Mr. Bullman's claim, the court determined that a claim for contribution does not 'mature' until a judgment is actually entered and satisfied. Citing federal interpretations of Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which is similar to Georgia's statute), the court noted that claims for contribution are generally not considered 'matured' until a judgment exists. Therefore, a contingent claim for contribution cannot be a compulsory counterclaim. The court distinguished this from permissive third-party actions under OCGA § 9-11-14 (a), which explicitly allow claims against those who 'may be liable,' indicating a different standard for maturity. For the claim against Templin, the court addressed whether it was barred for not being brought as a cross-claim in the original tort action. The court cited OCGA § 9-11-13 (g), which authorizes cross-claims, but emphasized that the language is 'permissive' and 'in no way makes a cross-claim...compulsory.' Referencing Marchman & Sons, Inc. v. Nelson, the court reiterated that the right to contribution arises out of, but exists separately from, the rights in the underlying suit, thus permitting a separate action. Finally, the court rejected Templin's argument that Tenneco's right to contribution was satisfied because she had paid her half. Since the jury found Tenneco, Templin, and Bullman to be joint tortfeasors, and Tenneco bore a greater share (one-half) than its pro rata share (one-third), Tenneco still had a right to contribution under OCGA § 51-12-32(a) to ensure all joint tortfeasors bear their pro rata share of the common burden.
Analysis:
This ruling establishes important precedent regarding the procedural timing of contribution claims in Georgia, clarifying that they are not subject to the compulsory counterclaim or cross-claim rules. This flexibility allows parties to pursue contribution in a separate action, which can prevent premature or speculative claims from complicating initial tort litigation. The decision ensures that joint tortfeasors who have paid more than their equitable share can still seek recovery, promoting the statutory goal of proportionate burden-sharing without mandating a specific litigation strategy in the original action. This impacts how attorneys advise clients on managing potential contribution claims following multi-party tort litigation.
