Tedla v. Ellman
1939 N.Y. LEXIS 1298, 19 N.E.2d 987, 280 N.Y. 124 (1939)
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Rule of Law:
The violation of a statute codifying a rule of the road does not constitute negligence per se if there is an adequate excuse for non-compliance, such as when adherence to the statute would subject a person to greater danger than disregarding it.
Facts:
- Anna Tedla and her brother, John Bachek, were walking along Sunrise Highway on a Sunday evening in December after dark.
- They were pushing baby carriages filled with junk they had collected from a village incinerator.
- A state statute required pedestrians to walk on the left side of the highway, facing oncoming traffic.
- Tedla and Bachek chose to walk on the right-hand (east-bound) roadway, with traffic at their backs, because it had very few cars.
- The left-hand (west-bound) roadway, where the statute directed them to walk, had 'very heavy Sunday night traffic'.
- An automobile operated by the defendant, Heilman, struck Tedla and Bachek from behind.
- Tedla was injured and Bachek, who was a deaf-mute, was killed.
- Bachek was carrying a lighted lantern at the time of the accident.
Procedural Posture:
- Anna Tedla sued Heilman in a New York trial court.
- At trial, the jury found that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the automobile operator, Heilman.
- The defendants appealed the judgment entered against them.
- On appeal, the defendants did not challenge the finding of their own negligence but argued that the plaintiffs were contributorily negligent as a matter of law for violating the pedestrian statute.
- The case was then heard by the Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a pedestrian's violation of a statutory rule of the road, which directs them to walk facing traffic, constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law, thereby barring recovery, when adherence to the statute would have placed the pedestrian in a more dangerous position?
Opinions:
Majority - Lehman, J.
No. A pedestrian's violation of a statutory rule of the road does not constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law when adherence to the statute would have been more dangerous. The court distinguished between two types of statutes: those that prescribe a specific safeguard against a recognized danger (like requiring lights on a vehicle, as in Martin v. Herzog), and those that codify general rules of conduct for public convenience and safety under usual conditions. The statute here falls into the latter category. The court reasoned that the Legislature could not have intended for a safety rule to be followed inflexibly when doing so would defeat its purpose and expose individuals to greater, not lesser, danger. When a rule of the road is meant for ordinary situations, deviation may be excused by special circumstances. In this case, the plaintiffs chose the less-trafficked side of the road, a decision prudence would dictate, and therefore their statutory violation was not negligence per se but a question of fact for the jury to consider in determining negligence and proximate cause.
Dissenting - O'Brien and Finch, JJ.
Yes. The violation of the statute constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law. The dissenters relied on the precedent of Martin v. Herzog, which held that the omission of a statutory safeguard is negligence in itself. They saw no valid distinction between the statute requiring pedestrians to walk a certain way and other safety statutes, concluding that the plaintiffs' violation should automatically bar their recovery.
Analysis:
This case is significant for refining the doctrine of negligence per se by creating a distinction between statutes that establish an absolute standard of care and those that merely codify general rules of the road. It introduces a 'good cause' or 'excuse' exception for violating rules of conduct when compliance would be more dangerous than non-compliance. This decision prevents the mechanical application of statutes from producing absurd or unjust results, allowing the fact-finder to consider the reasonableness of a party's actions in context. It affirms that the ultimate purpose of such safety statutes is to prevent harm, a purpose that would be undermined by punishing individuals for choosing a safer course of action that technically violates the law.
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