Taylor v. Vallelunga
339 P.2d 910, 1959 Cal. App. LEXIS 1797, 171 Cal.App.2d 107 (1959)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant is not liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress to a third-party observer of the defendant's conduct unless the defendant acted with the purpose of causing the observer emotional distress, or with knowledge that severe emotional distress was substantially certain to be produced.
Facts:
- Defendants struck and beat Clifford Gerlaeh on December 25, 1956.
- Gail E. Taylor, the daughter of Clifford Gerlaeh, was present during the beating and witnessed it.
- As a direct result of witnessing the battery, Taylor suffered severe fright and emotional distress.
- Taylor did not suffer any resulting physical disability or injury from the emotional distress.
Procedural Posture:
- Clifford Gerlaeh and Gail E. Taylor filed a complaint in a California trial court against the defendants.
- Taylor's second count in the complaint sought damages for emotional distress from witnessing the battery of her father.
- Defendants filed a general demurrer to Taylor's second count, arguing it failed to state a valid cause of action.
- The trial court sustained the demurrer but granted Taylor 10 days leave to amend her complaint.
- Taylor failed to amend her complaint, and the court entered a judgment of dismissal on the second count.
- Taylor, as the appellant, appealed the judgment of dismissal to the California District Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for witnessing a battery on a third person if she fails to allege that the defendants knew of her presence or that they acted with the purpose of causing her emotional distress?
Opinions:
Majority - O’Donnell, J. pro tem.
No. A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires that the defendant's conduct be directed at the plaintiff, which means the defendant must have acted with the purpose of causing the emotional distress or with knowledge that such distress was substantially certain to result. The court adopted the standard from the Restatement of Torts, § 46, which requires intent. 'Intent' is defined as acting with the purpose of causing the distress or with knowledge that severe emotional distress is substantially certain to be produced. The court highlighted the Restatement's own illustration, where a defendant is liable to a wife for killing her husband in her presence only because the defendant knew the wife was present. In this case, Taylor's complaint was deficient because it failed to allege that the defendants knew she was present or that they beat her father with the purpose of causing her distress. Without such an allegation, the defendants' conduct was not intentionally directed at her, and thus a key element of the tort is missing.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a key limitation on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) for bystander plaintiffs. By requiring that the defendant know of the bystander's presence and act with specific intent relative to them, the court prevents liability from extending to any person who happens to witness a tortious act. This ruling solidifies the requirement that the defendant's outrageous conduct must be directed at the plaintiff for an IIED claim to succeed. It distinguishes bystander IIED from negligence-based claims (like those later developed in Dillon v. Legg), reinforcing that the core of this intentional tort is the defendant's culpable mental state toward the specific plaintiff.
