Taylor v. Sturgell
128 S. Ct. 2161 (2008)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The doctrine of claim preclusion does not bar a nonparty from litigating an issue decided in a prior action, even if the nonparty has similar interests to a party in the prior action. Preclusion is only permitted under one of six established exceptions, and the theory of 'virtual representation' is not a permissible exception to the general rule against nonparty preclusion.
Facts:
- Greg Herrick, an antique aircraft enthusiast, sought technical documents from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to restore his vintage F-45 airplane.
- Herrick filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for the documents.
- The FAA denied the request after Fairchild Corporation, the successor to the aircraft's manufacturer, objected, claiming the documents were trade secrets.
- Herrick filed a lawsuit against the FAA to compel release of the documents, but the suit was ultimately unsuccessful.
- Less than a month after the final judgment against Herrick, his friend Brent Taylor, also an aircraft enthusiast, filed a new FOIA request for the exact same documents.
- Taylor and Herrick have no legal relationship, and there was no evidence that Taylor controlled, financed, participated in, or had notice of Herrick's earlier lawsuit.
Procedural Posture:
- Herrick sued the FAA in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, which granted summary judgment to the FAA.
- On appeal by Herrick, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.
- Taylor subsequently sued the FAA in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
- The D.C. District Court granted summary judgment to the FAA, holding Taylor's suit was barred by claim preclusion under the doctrine of 'virtual representation.'
- Taylor appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which affirmed the lower court's ruling, applying its own five-factor test for virtual representation.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Taylor's petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the issue of virtual representation.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the doctrine of 'virtual representation' permit a nonparty to be claim-precluded from litigating an issue that was already decided in a lawsuit brought by another party with similar interests, where the nonparty had no legal relationship to and did not participate in the prior litigation?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
No. The doctrine of 'virtual representation' is not a valid exception to the deep-rooted principle that a person is not bound by a judgment in a case to which they were not a party. The Court identified only six established exceptions where a nonparty can be bound: 1) agreement to be bound; 2) pre-existing substantive legal relationships (e.g., privity); 3) adequate representation in a properly conducted suit, such as a class action; 4) assumption of control over the prior litigation; 5) relitigation through a proxy or agent; and 6) special statutory schemes. The 'virtual representation' doctrine, with its diffuse, multi-factor balancing tests, is an amorphous and improper expansion of these exceptions. It would effectively create 'de facto class actions' without the procedural safeguards, like notice and adequate representation, that are required by the Due Process Clause and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The Court prefers 'crisp rules with sharp corners' in preclusion doctrine to ensure predictability and protect a litigant’s right to their own day in court.
Analysis:
This decision decisively rejects the expanding 'virtual representation' doctrine that had been adopted by several federal circuits. By invalidating this amorphous, multi-factor test, the Court reinforced the fundamental due process right to one's own day in court. It clarified that nonparty preclusion is a narrow exception, not a broad, equitable concept, confining it to six discrete, historically recognized categories. This holding provides clarity and predictability for litigants and lower courts, preventing the creation of 'common-law class actions' that lack the procedural protections mandated by federal rules.
Unlock the full brief for Taylor v. Sturgell