No. You can't sue a doctor for this in Michigan. The court said it's wrong to treat the birth of a child, even one with disabilities, as a legal 'harm' that someone can be sued for. Allowing this kind of lawsuit suggests that some lives are less valuable than others, which is a dangerous idea. Besides, even if this type of lawsuit were allowed, the parents waited too long to file it; the legal clock started ticking the day the doctor misread the ultrasound, not the day the baby was born.

The parents lose, but the main judges are wrong to make a big new rule. I agree that the parents lose because they filed their lawsuit too late. But I am upset that the other judges used this case to get rid of the 'wrongful birth' lawsuit type altogether, because nobody in the case even asked them to. I think that was overstepping their authority as judges and that the case should have been decided only on the simple fact that the parents missed the deadline to sue.

No, parents shouldn't be allowed to sue for 'wrongful birth' in Michigan because it goes against the state's values and could promote harmful ideas about people with disabilities being 'unfit.' The Taylors also sued too late - they only had two years from when the doctor made a mistake, not from when their baby was born. The court was right to dismiss their case.

I agree the Taylors sued too late and didn't have a strong case for emotional distress. But I don't think the court should have decided parents can never sue for 'wrongful birth' in Michigan, because no one asked the court to decide that in this case. Those statements don't really count as law.

No. Michigan law does not recognize a cause of action for 'wrongful birth.' This court holds that, as a matter of law, the tort has no continued place in Michigan's jurisprudence. First, recognizing wrongful birth is logically inconsistent with Michigan's rejection of the related 'wrongful life' tort and its limitations on 'wrongful conception' claims. Second, the precedent that established the tort relied on a 'benefits rule' that has since been undermined by case law stating that the value of human life always outweighs the cost of raising a child. Third, the tort promotes the dangerous and eugenically-tinged public policy that a disabled life is worth less than a non-disabled one, which conflicts with Michigan's policy preference for childbirth. Finally, the court holds in the alternative that even if the tort existed, the Taylors' claim would be barred by the statute of limitations, which began to run on the date of the negligent ultrasound interpretation (December 4, 1993), not the date of birth, making their 1996 complaint untimely.

The majority is correct to affirm the dismissal, but its reasoning is improper. The court should not have addressed the viability of the wrongful birth tort because that issue was never raised, briefed, or argued by the parties. The case should have been decided solely on the narrow and dispositive issue that the plaintiffs' claim was barred by the statute of limitations. By reaching out to abolish a cause of action that was not challenged, the majority engages in unnecessary judicial activism and its discussion on that point is merely obiter dictum with no precedential value. I concur only in the majority's conclusion that the wrongful birth claim is barred by the statute of limitations and that the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress was properly dismissed.

No, the wrongful birth tort does not have a rightful place in Michigan jurisprudence because it is fundamentally unsound and contrary to Michigan public policy. I believe it invites the application of eugenic principles. The Taylors' wrongful birth claim is also barred by the statute of limitations because it accrued on the date of the alleged negligent act, December 4, 1993, when Kurapati misinterpreted the ultrasound. The Taylors did not file their complaint until August 1996, well beyond the two-year limitations period. Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary disposition for the defendants on the wrongful birth claim.

I concur with the majority's conclusion that the Taylors' wrongful birth claim is barred by the statute of limitations and with the resolution of the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. However, I dissent from the majority's discussion purporting to abolish the wrongful birth tort in Michigan. The continued viability of the wrongful birth cause of action was not raised by the parties or addressed by the trial court. The majority's statements abolishing the tort are non-binding dicta that should be reserved for a case where the issue is properly before this Court.

Taylor v. Kurapati

Case Podcast

Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

Gunnerbot