Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp.
47 A.3d 1190, 2012 WL 2913750, 616 Pa. 385 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
A pre-injury exculpatory clause is unenforceable on public policy grounds to the extent it purports to release a party from liability for its own reckless conduct. However, a release that names only the employer corporation will be construed to also cover its employees acting within the scope of their employment.
Facts:
- Barbara Lichtman Tayar and her family visited a ski resort operated by Camelback Ski Corporation, Inc. to go snow tubing.
- Before participating, Tayar was required to sign a pre-printed release form agreeing not to sue and to release Camelback from liability for injuries resulting from "negligence or any other improper conduct."
- Tayar and her family chose to use the "family" tubing slopes, where a Camelback employee, Brian Monaghan, was stationed at the top to control when each person was sent down the slope.
- After completing four successful runs, Tayar began her fifth run and reached the receiving area at the bottom of the slope.
- After Tayar had exited her snow tube, Monaghan sent another snow tuber down the slope, who then collided with Tayar.
- As other Camelback employees rushed to assist Tayar, they yelled at Monaghan to stop sending more tubers down the slope.
- As a result of the collision, Tayar suffered multiple comminuted fractures of her right leg, requiring surgery, two metal plates, and 14 screws.
Procedural Posture:
- Barbara Lichtman Tayar sued Camelback Ski Corporation and its employee, Brian Monaghan, in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County.
- The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Tayar's claims were barred by the signed release.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding the release validly barred the claims.
- Tayar, the appellant, appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
- A three-judge panel of the Superior Court initially affirmed the trial court's decision.
- The Superior Court granted Tayar's request for a rehearing en banc.
- The en banc Superior Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, finding a question of fact as to whether the employee's conduct was reckless and holding the release did not cover the employee.
- Camelback and Monaghan, as appellants, petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for review, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a pre-injury exculpatory clause that purports to release a party from liability for reckless conduct violate public policy?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Todd
Yes, a pre-injury exculpatory clause that purports to release a party from liability for reckless conduct violates public policy. The court distinguished recklessness from negligence, defining recklessness as a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, which aligns it more closely with intentional conduct than with the 'unconscious inadvertence' of negligence. Citing the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195, the court held that allowing parties to release liability for reckless behavior would remove incentives to adhere to minimal standards of care, thereby jeopardizing public health, safety, and welfare. On a secondary issue, the court held that the release, which named only 'Camelback Ski Corporation,' also covered the employee, Monaghan, because a corporation can only act through its employees, and he was acting within the scope of his employment.
Concurring and dissenting - Justice Eakin
Yes, a release of liability for reckless conduct violates public policy. However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the release covered the employee, Brian Monaghan. Exculpatory clauses must be strictly construed against the party seeking immunity. Because a corporation is a separate legal entity and the release did not explicitly name employees or agents, it should not be read to exculpate Monaghan in his personal capacity.
Concurring and dissenting - Justice Baer
The court should not have reached the public policy issue regarding reckless conduct. I agree with the majority that the release covered the employee, Monaghan. However, the issue of whether Monaghan's conduct was actually reckless was not properly preserved for appeal, and even if it were, the trial court correctly found that the plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that the conduct rose above ordinary negligence. Since the release is valid for negligence, the court should have simply reversed the Superior Court and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Camelback and Monaghan, without addressing the broader public policy question.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a clear, bright-line rule in Pennsylvania that parties cannot contractually release liability for future reckless conduct. The ruling aligns Pennsylvania with the vast majority of other states and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, clarifying the limits of exculpatory clauses. While such clauses can absolve parties of liability for ordinary negligence in recreational settings, they cannot immunize them from the consequences of consciously disregarding a substantial risk of harm. This precedent impacts how recreational businesses draft liability waivers and reinforces the principle that public policy places a floor on the standard of care that cannot be waived by contract.
