Tatur v. Solsrud
20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1094, 481 N.W.2d 657, 167 Wis. 2d 266 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A false representation of a political candidate's voting record is not defamatory as a matter of law because it does not constitute an assault on the person's character that would lower their esteem in the community.
Facts:
- Randolph Tatur and seven other candidates were incumbents running for reelection to the Rusk County Board.
- During the election campaign, David J. Solsrud and John Christman sent letters to electors.
- The letters contained allegedly false statements and misrepresentations about how the candidates had voted on specific resolutions, primarily concerning expenditures and taxes.
- Examples of the alleged misrepresentations included claims that the candidates voted against curbing new hiring, against repealing a tax penalty, and in favor of paying for a county management oversight.
- The letters were distributed to the public four days before the election.
- All of the incumbent candidates who were the subject of the letters were defeated in the election.
Procedural Posture:
- Randolph Tatur and other candidates (plaintiffs) sued David J. Solsrud and John Christman (defendants) in a Wisconsin trial court for defamation.
- The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the statements were not defamatory as a matter of law.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Solsrud and Christman.
- The candidates (appellants) appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does misrepresenting a political candidate's voting record on specific issues constitute defamation as a matter of law?
Opinions:
Majority - LaRocque, J.
No, misrepresenting how a candidate votes on an issue is not defamatory as a matter of law because it does not assault a person's character in a way that would lower their esteem in a community. A communication is only defamatory if it harms reputation. The court found this situation analogous to Frinzi v. Hanson, where stating a politician was not a 'good Democrat' was held not to be libelous, even if it cost him votes. Similarly, how an official votes is not inherently disgraceful, even if it causes electors to vote against them. The fact that the misrepresentations were intentional does not make an otherwise nondefamatory statement defamatory. Furthermore, the violation of a statute criminalizing false campaign representations (sec. 12.05, Stats.) does not create defamation per se, as the statute does not express a clear intent to change the common law of defamation.
Dissenting - Cane, P.J.
Yes, the intentional misrepresentations should be considered capable of a defamatory meaning. Defamatory language must be interpreted in the context in which it was used. Here, the letters were intentionally false, distributed four days before an election, and, if believed, would make the candidates appear as 'spendthrifts' who did not care about taxpayer money. The sole purpose of these lies was to lower the candidates' estimation in the community to cause their defeat at the polls. While robust political debate is necessary, the line must be drawn at intentionally false representations of fact made to influence an election. A candidate should not have to accept intentionally false statements that lower their standing in the community's eyes.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a high bar for public officials claiming defamation based on political speech in Wisconsin. It draws a crucial distinction between attacks on a politician's policy positions or voting record and attacks on their personal character or integrity. By ruling that even intentional falsehoods about a voting record are not defamatory as a matter of law, the court prioritizes robust, and even inaccurate, political debate over protecting candidates from statements that may cost them an election. This precedent significantly limits the scope of defamation claims arising from political campaigns, forcing future plaintiffs to show that the false statements targeted their personal character rather than their political actions.
