Tanzin v. Tanvir
592 U. S. ____ (2020) (2020)
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Rule of Law:
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) permits litigants to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities when those officials substantially burden their religious exercise.
Facts:
- Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) to provide a remedy for federal government violations of the right to free exercise under the First Amendment, aiming to restore the pre-Employment Div. v. Smith 'compelling interest test'.
- Muhammad Tanvir, Jameel Algibhah, and Naveed Shinwari are practicing Muslims.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents placed Tanvir, Algibhah, and Shinwari on the No Fly List.
- The FBI agents allegedly placed them on the No Fly List in retaliation for their refusal to act as informants against their religious communities.
- Being on the No Fly List caused Tanvir, Algibhah, and Shinwari to incur substantial financial losses, including wasted airline tickets and lost income from job opportunities.
- More than a year after Tanvir, Algibhah, and Shinwari initiated their lawsuit, the Department of Homeland Security informed them that they could now fly.
Procedural Posture:
- Muhammad Tanvir, Jameel Algibhah, and Naveed Shinwari sued various FBI agents in a District Court, seeking injunctive relief against the agents in their official capacities (removal from the No Fly List) and monetary damages against the agents in their individual capacities.
- The Department of Homeland Security later informed Tanvir, Algibhah, and Shinwari that they could now fly, thus mooting their claims for injunctive relief.
- The District Court dismissed the individual-capacity claims for money damages, ruling that RFRA does not permit monetary relief.
- Tanvir, Algibhah, and Shinwari appealed the District Court's dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Second Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, holding that RFRA’s express remedies provision encompasses money damages against Government officials.
- The federal officials (Tanzin et al.) sought certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) permit litigants to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities when their religious exercise has been substantially burdened?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Thomas
Yes, RFRA’s express remedies provision permits litigants, when appropriate, to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities. The Court reasoned that RFRA's text explicitly defines 'government' to include 'an official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States,' which supplants the ordinary meaning of 'government' and means relief executable against an 'official' is 'relief against a government.' This interpretation is reinforced by the phrase 'persons acting under color of law,' which draws on 42 U.S.C. §1983 and has long been interpreted to permit individual-capacity suits. The term 'appropriate relief' is open-ended and context-dependent, and historically, damages have been awarded as appropriate relief in suits against government officials. The availability of damages under §1983 is particularly salient, as RFRA was enacted to reinstate pre-Smith protections, and §1983 always allowed damages for First Amendment violations against state officials, thus mandating at least the same avenue for relief against federal officials. Moreover, damages are often the only effective remedy for certain RFRA violations, such as lost income or wasted expenses. The Court distinguished Sossamon v. Texas, which involved state sovereign immunity, noting that individual officials do not enjoy such immunity. The Court concluded that Congress knew how to limit remedies to equitable relief if it intended to do so, but chose the broader 'appropriate relief,' and it is not the Court's role to create new policy-based presumptions against damages.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the remedies available under RFRA, ensuring that individuals whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by federal officials can seek full compensation, not just injunctive relief. By explicitly allowing money damages against officials in their individual capacities, the Court reinforces RFRA's purpose of vigorously protecting religious freedom and creates a stronger deterrent against government overreach. The reliance on the 'under color of law' language from Section 1983 solidifies the understanding that individual liability for civil rights violations is a well-established legal principle applicable even when the government entity itself is immune. This ruling provides a more robust avenue for redress, particularly for past harms that cannot be undone by an injunction.
