Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.
566 U. S. ____ (2012) (2012)
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Rule of Law:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6), the taxable cost for 'compensation of interpreters' is limited to the cost of oral interpretation and does not extend to the cost of translating written documents.
Facts:
- Kouichi Taniguchi, a professional baseball player from Japan, was visiting a resort in the Northern Mariana Islands owned by Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.
- While touring the resort, Taniguchi's leg broke through a wooden deck, causing injury.
- Initially, Taniguchi stated he did not need medical attention.
- Two weeks later, Taniguchi informed Kan Pacific Saipan that he had suffered cuts, bruises, and torn ligaments from the accident.
- Taniguchi claimed damages for medical expenses and lost income from contracts he was unable to fulfill due to his injuries.
- In preparing its defense for the subsequent lawsuit, Kan Pacific Saipan paid to have several documents translated from Japanese into English.
Procedural Posture:
- Kouichi Taniguchi filed a personal injury lawsuit against Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Kan Pacific Saipan.
- Following the judgment, Kan Pacific Saipan submitted a bill for its litigation costs, which included fees for translating documents from Japanese to English.
- The District Court awarded these document translation costs to Kan Pacific Saipan, ruling they fell under 'compensation of interpreters' in 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6).
- Taniguchi, as appellant, appealed both the summary judgment and the cost award to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decisions, holding that the term 'interpreter' in the statute could reasonably encompass a 'translator' of written documents.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Taniguchi's petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve a split among the circuit courts on this issue.
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Issue:
Does the phrase 'compensation of interpreters' in 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) authorize a federal court to award the costs of translating written documents to a prevailing party?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Alito
No. The phrase 'compensation of interpreters' under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) is limited to the cost of oral translation and does not include costs for translating written documents. The Court's reasoning is grounded in a textualist interpretation of the statute. When the Court Interpreters Act amended § 1920 in 1978, the ordinary and common meaning of the word 'interpreter' referred to a person who translates orally. A survey of contemporaneous dictionaries shows that most defined 'interpreter' in terms of spoken language, with some even designating the written-translation sense as 'obsolete.' The statutory context further supports this narrow reading, as the Court Interpreters Act focuses on facilitating oral communication in court proceedings through methods like simultaneous and consecutive interpretation, which are irrelevant to written documents. Furthermore, the limited nature of taxable costs under § 1920, which covers relatively minor, incidental expenses, counsels against a broad reading that would include the potentially substantial cost of document translation.
Dissenting - Justice Ginsburg
Yes. The term 'interpreter' is broad enough to encompass those who translate written documents, and the purpose of the statute supports awarding such costs. The dissent argues that some dictionaries do define 'interpreter' to include written translation, and this usage is at least 'acceptable.' More importantly, the purpose of translation, whether oral or written, is to make foreign-language communication accessible to the court and litigants to ensure a fair proceeding. The dissent notes that federal courts historically awarded costs for document translation even before § 1920(6) was enacted, and there is no indication Congress intended to eliminate this practice. Finally, the distinction between oral and written translation is often blurry, as seen in 'sight translation' (orally translating a document), and a rigid rule creates practical difficulties and is contrary to the long-standing practice of trial courts, which are capable of assessing the necessity and reasonableness of such costs.
Analysis:
This decision resolves a circuit split by narrowly defining 'interpreter' for the purposes of taxable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6). It establishes a clear, nationwide rule that prevailing parties in federal litigation cannot recover costs for written document translation. This has a significant financial impact on cases involving international parties or extensive foreign-language evidence, as litigants must now absorb these potentially substantial costs themselves. The ruling reinforces a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, prioritizing the ordinary meaning of a word at the time of its enactment over policy arguments or evolving judicial practice.
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