Tacka v. Georgetown University
30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1065, 193 F. Supp. 2d 43, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23895 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
An employer's contractual obligation to follow specific procedures in an employee handbook for handling serious allegations is enforceable, and any privilege against defamation for statements made during an employee evaluation is qualified, not absolute, and can be overcome by a showing of malice or excessive publication.
Facts:
- Philip Tacka, a music professor at Georgetown University, applied for tenure in late 1997.
- As part of the review, the department chair, Elizabeth Prelinger, retained Dr. Jill Trinka to provide an external evaluation of Tacka's scholarly work.
- In her February 1998 evaluation, Dr. Trinka accused Tacka of plagiarizing a published article from a book written by his former doctoral adviser, Professor Michael Mark.
- Tacka's article was derived from the introductory chapter of his own doctoral dissertation, which Professor Mark had supervised.
- Upon learning of the accusation in March 1998, Tacka repeatedly requested that his tenure application be paused and the plagiarism charge be investigated according to the procedures in the university's faculty handbook.
- Despite these requests, the university's tenure committees proceeded to consider and deny Tacka's application.
- The university did not refer the plagiarism charge to its designated Research Integrity Committee until July 1998, five months after the allegation was made.
- The Research Integrity Committee ultimately exonerated Tacka of plagiarism in December 1998.
Procedural Posture:
- Philip Tacka filed a lawsuit against Georgetown University in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging defamation and breach of contract.
- Georgetown University previously filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the defamation claim, which the court denied on July 17, 2001.
- Georgetown University then filed the current motion for summary judgment on both the breach of contract and defamation claims.
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Issue:
Does an employer possess a qualified, rather than absolute, privilege against a defamation claim when an employee implicitly consents to a performance evaluation containing a serious accusation, and can that privilege be defeated by evidence of malice or excessive publication?
Opinions:
Majority - Oberdorfer, District Judge
Yes, an employer's privilege is qualified and can be defeated. The court held that where an employee implicitly consents to an evaluation, the employer's privilege to publish defamatory statements is qualified, not absolute, especially when the accusation is as severe as plagiarism. This qualified privilege can be overcome by showing genuine issues of material fact regarding malice or excessive publication. The court reasoned that recent precedent, specifically Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, favors a qualified privilege in employment evaluation contexts to prevent employers from maliciously making false, career-damaging accusations with impunity. An absolute privilege is inappropriate where consent is merely implicit and the defamatory statement is exceptionally serious. Here, Tacka raised sufficient questions of fact about malice (Prelinger's potential motivations and procedural violations) and excessive publication (sharing the unsubstantiated claim with tenure committees before the proper integrity committee and failing to ensure the evaluator's confidentiality) to defeat summary judgment. The court also denied summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, finding a genuine issue of fact as to whether Georgetown's delay in following the handbook's plagiarism investigation procedures constituted a breach causing compensable harm.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies defamation law in the District of Columbia by solidifying the precedent from Wallace over the older Farrington line of cases, favoring a qualified privilege for employers in employee evaluation contexts. It establishes that the severity of the alleged defamatory statement is a critical factor in limiting an employer's privilege. The ruling serves as a strong warning to employers, particularly academic institutions, that they must strictly adhere to their own internal procedures for handling serious misconduct allegations. Failure to do so not only risks liability for breach of contract but also weakens any claim of privilege in a subsequent defamation suit by creating evidence of potential malice or excessive publication.
