Tabler v. Board of Supervisors
269 S.E.2d 358, 221 Va. 200, 1980 Va. LEXIS 235 (1980)
Rule of Law:
Under the Dillon Rule of strict construction, local governing bodies in Virginia possess only those legislative powers expressly granted by the General Assembly, those necessarily or fairly implied from expressly granted powers, and those essential and indispensable to their functions; powers will not be implied if legislative intent, as demonstrated by prior legislative action or inaction, shows the General Assembly did not intend to confer them.
Facts:
- On December 8, 1975, the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County (County Board) enacted the Beverage Container Ordinance.
- On June 6, 1977, the ordinance was amended to require that every container in which nonalcoholic beverages are sold or offered for sale in Fairfax County must have a cash refund value of not less than five cents.
- The amended Beverage Container Ordinance became effective on September 1, 1977.
- Charles Tabler, trading as Foodarama Supermarket, and a group of corporations engaged in the business of bottling and distributing soft drinks sold and offered for sale nonalcoholic beverages in Fairfax County.
Procedural Posture:
- On August 23, 1977, Charles Tabler, trading as Foodarama Supermarket, and a group of soft drink corporations (appellants) instituted a suit in the trial court challenging the validity of the ordinance and requesting temporary and permanent injunctive relief against its enforcement.
- In August 1977, the trial court denied the appellants' petition for a temporary injunction.
- In September 1977, the Supreme Court of Virginia also denied the appellants' petition for a temporary injunction.
- In May 1978, the chancellor (trial court) entered a decree holding that the County Board was authorized to enact the ordinance and dismissed the appellants’ bill of complaint.
- The Supreme Court of Virginia granted an appeal, limited to considering whether the County Board possessed legislative authority to enact the Beverage Container Ordinance.
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Issue:
Does the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County possess legislative authority to enact an ordinance requiring a minimum cash refund value on containers for nonalcoholic beverages?
Opinions:
Majority - I'ANSON, C. J.
No, the County Board did not possess legislative authority to enact an ordinance requiring a minimum cash refund value on containers for nonalcoholic beverages. Virginia adheres to the Dillon Rule of strict construction regarding the legislative powers of local governing bodies, which limits their authority to powers expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied from express grants, and those essential and indispensable. The General Assembly's express grants of authority cited by Fairfax County (such as those concerning garbage, litter, or public health and safety) do not explicitly provide the power to mandate a minimum refund value on beverage containers. To determine implied authority, the court must analyze the legislative intent of the General Assembly. This court consistently refuses to imply powers that the General Assembly clearly did not intend to convey. Reviewing the General Assembly's history, it has consistently rejected proposed legislation that would have banned nonreturnable bottles (1972), taxed nonreturnable containers (1974, 1975, 1976), or set a minimum refund value on beverage containers (several recent sessions). Furthermore, the General Assembly rejected proposed charter amendments for the City of Alexandria that would have explicitly granted the power to regulate or prohibit disposable containers (1971, 1976). These repeated actions and inactions clearly and unambiguously demonstrate that the General Assembly did not intend to grant local governing bodies the power to regulate or prohibit the sale or use of disposable containers, including setting a minimum refund value. Therefore, the County Board lacked the legislative authority to enact the ordinance, and the trial court erred in upholding its provisions. The court declined to consider Acts 1978, c. 765 (Code § 10-213.1) and House J. Res. 174 because they contained clauses preventing interference with pending litigation.
Analysis:
This case significantly reaffirms the strict application of the Dillon Rule in Virginia, serving as a critical reminder that local government powers are narrowly construed. It establishes that the General Assembly's legislative silence or repeated rejection of proposed legislation on a particular topic can be interpreted as an intentional withholding of authority from local bodies. Consequently, localities seeking to enact new ordinances must identify a clear and affirmative grant of power from the state, either express or undeniably implied. This precedent imposes a high bar for local legislative innovation, particularly in areas where the state legislature has previously considered but declined to act, limiting the scope of home rule and preserving state legislative supremacy.
