T.D. v. M.M.M.
1999 La. LEXIS 310, 730 So. 2d 873 (1999)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The equitable doctrine of laches will not bar a biological father's avowal action to establish paternity unless the party asserting the defense proves both an unreasonable delay by the father in filing the action and actual prejudice resulting from that delay.
Facts:
- T.D. and M.M.M. were married in 1984.
- In 1986, T.D. began a multi-year adulterous affair with P.W.
- T.D. conceived a child, C.M., in March 1988, informing P.W. he was likely the father but telling her husband, M.M.M., that he was the father.
- After C.M.'s birth in December 1988, P.W. regularly visited C.M., always suspecting he was the father.
- In June 1993, a DNA test confirmed to a 99.5% probability that P.W. was C.M.'s biological father.
- T.D. and M.M.M. divorced in June 1993.
- In November 1993, T.D. ended her affair with P.W. and subsequently denied him access to C.M.
Procedural Posture:
- In an existing domestic proceeding between T.D. and M.M.M., P.W. filed a petition in intervention in the trial court seeking to be recognized as C.M.'s biological father.
- The legal parents, T.D. and M.M.M., objected to the intervention.
- The trial court ruled in favor of P.W., recognizing his biological paternity and ordering an evidentiary hearing to determine visitation and support in the child's best interest.
- The legal parents, as appellants, appealed the trial court's judgment to the intermediate court of appeal.
- The court of appeal reversed the trial court's decision, finding that P.W.'s action was barred by the doctrine of laches, and dismissed his petition.
- P.W. sought and was granted a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court of Louisiana to review the court of appeal's decision.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the doctrine of laches bar a biological father's action to establish paternity of a child born during the mother's marriage to another man, filed approximately six years after the child's birth and after the mother ended their affair and denied him access?
Opinions:
Majority - Traylor, J.
No. The doctrine of laches does not bar the biological father's action because the legal parents failed to prove its essential elements. Laches requires a showing of both unreasonable delay and prejudice. The court found P.W.'s delay was not unreasonable, as it was partly caused by the mother's actions and he filed suit within a year of being denied access to the child. Furthermore, no prejudice to the child was proven, as the trial court merely established the fact of biological paternity and ordered a 'best interest of the child' hearing to determine visitation, which is the proper forum to consider any potential harm.
Concurring - Knoll, J.
No. While the result is correct, the analysis should not be based on the common law doctrine of laches, but on the unwed biological father's constitutionally protected liberty interest in the relationship with his child. Once the mother's marriage to the legal father was dissolved, the state's interest in protecting the marital family diminished significantly. At that point, the biological father's due process rights require a hearing to balance his interests against the child's best interests, especially where paternity is scientifically proven.
Dissenting - Calogero, C.J.
The issue of laches should not be reached because the biological father lacks standing to bring this avowal action. Louisiana's Civil Code does not grant a biological father standing to rebut the legal presumption that a child born during a marriage is the child of the husband. Only the child has the right to seek dual paternity, and public policy dictates that the established legal family unit should be protected from such intrusions.
Dissenting - Kimball, J.
The issue of laches is irrelevant because P.W. lacks standing to bring an avowal action. Louisiana law has historically maintained one of the strongest presumptions of paternity in the nation, protecting the marital family. The Civil Code explicitly grants standing to challenge this presumption only to the husband, the child, and the state (for child support purposes). The legislature affirmatively chose not to grant standing to a biological father in P.W.'s position, and allowing this judicially-created action undermines the important public policy of promoting stable family relationships.
Analysis:
This decision affirms a biological father's right to pursue a judicially-created 'avowal action' in Louisiana, even when the child has a legal father through marriage. It sets a high bar for using laches as a defense, requiring concrete proof of both unreasonable delay and actual prejudice, and signals that a mother's conduct can excuse a father's delay. The two strong dissents reveal a deep jurisprudential conflict, arguing that the majority has improperly expanded standing beyond what the Civil Code allows, thereby undermining the legislature's intent to protect the stability of the marital family.
