Szafranski v. Dunston
993 N.E.2d 502, 2013 IL App (1st) 122975 (2013)
Rule of Law:
In Illinois, disputes over the disposition of cryopreserved pre-embryos are primarily resolved by enforcing valid advance agreements between the gamete donors, and absent such an agreement, by balancing the parties' interests, generally favoring the party wishing to avoid procreation if the other party has alternative means of achieving parenthood.
Facts:
- In March 2010, Karla Dunston was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and informed that chemotherapy treatments would likely cause the loss of her fertility.
- Dunston asked Jacob Szafranski, her then-boyfriend, if he would donate his sperm to create pre-embryos with her eggs, and he agreed to do so.
- On March 25, 2010, Dunston and Szafranski met with physicians at Northwestern and signed an “INFORMED CONSENT FOR ASSISTED REPRODUCTION” stating, “No use can be made of these embryos without the consent of both partners.”
- The couple also met with attorney Nidhi Desai, who presented options for a co-parent or sperm donor agreement, and Dunston subsequently emailed Desai opting for a co-parent agreement.
- A draft co-parent agreement was sent to the couple, which provided that Dunston would control the disposition of the pre-embryos if they separated and that Szafranski agreed to her use due to her infertility, but Szafranski never signed this agreement.
- On April 6, 2010, Szafranski deposited sperm, eight eggs were retrieved from Dunston and fertilized, resulting in three viable pre-embryos.
- On April 7, 2010, Dunston began her chemotherapy treatment.
- In May 2010, Szafranski sent Dunston a text message ending their relationship.
Procedural Posture:
- Jacob Szafranski filed a pro se complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County, seeking to permanently enjoin Karla Dunston from using the pre-embryos.
- Karla Dunston responded with a three-count verified counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment granting her sole custody and control over the pre-embryos, alleging breach of contract, and seeking relief under a theory of promissory estoppel.
- At the close of discovery, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the Circuit Court of Cook County.
- On September 17, 2012, the Circuit Court of Cook County granted Dunston's motion for summary judgment and denied Szafranski's cross-motion, adopting a balancing of interests approach similar to Reber v. Reiss.
- On September 18, 2012, the Circuit Court entered a written order granting Dunston full custody and control over the disputed pre-embryos.
- Szafranski appealed the Circuit Court's ruling to the Illinois Appellate Court, First District.
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Issue:
What legal framework should Illinois courts apply to determine the disposition of cryopreserved pre-embryos when gamete donors dispute their use, specifically when there is a disagreement after the relationship ends?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Quinn
Illinois courts should first apply a contractual approach to determine the disposition of cryopreserved pre-embryos, and if no valid advance agreement exists, then a balancing of the parties' interests. The court held that the best approach for resolving such disputes is to honor the parties' own mutually expressed intent as set forth in their prior agreements, thereby joining other state courts that enforce such agreements (e.g., Kass v. Kass, Davis v. Davis, In re Marriage of Dahl). This contractual approach promotes autonomy, encourages serious discussions before in vitro fertilization, and provides certainty in family planning. The court acknowledged criticisms that individuals may change their minds but found the benefits outweigh these concerns, especially since a contract can address such contingencies. If no advance agreement exists, the court held that the relative interests of the parties in using or not using the pre-embryos must be weighed. Under this balancing approach (drawing from Davis v. Davis), the party wishing to avoid procreation ordinarily prevails, assuming the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by other means; however, if the intent is merely to donate the embryos, the objecting party's interest in avoiding procreation is considered greater. The court rejected Szafranski's constitutional arguments, finding no credible basis to equate IVF contracts with contracts for sexual intercourse, nor any clear public policy against such agreements. It further stated that constitutional rights can be waived by contract and that abortion case law balancing a woman's and man's rights does not translate directly to pre-embryos outside the body. The court concluded that the circuit court erred by prematurely applying a balancing approach without first determining if a valid contract existed. Thus, the summary judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded for the circuit court to apply the contractual approach to the previously adduced facts and any additional facts the parties may present.
Analysis:
This case establishes a significant two-tiered legal framework in Illinois for handling disputes over cryopreserved pre-embryos, prioritizing the enforcement of advance agreements. By adopting the contractual approach, Illinois aligns with the majority of other jurisdictions, promoting predictability and party autonomy in reproductive decisions. The secondary balancing test provides a default mechanism when no agreement exists, attempting to mitigate the coercive potential of a blanket 'mutual consent' rule. This decision emphasizes the critical importance of clear, comprehensive advance directives in assisted reproduction, likely prompting fertility clinics and individuals to draft more robust and legally binding agreements to prevent future litigation.
