Syed v. Lee
488 Md. 537 (2024)
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Rule of Law:
The entry of a nolle prosequi by the State's Attorney does not moot an appeal by a crime victim's representative of an order vacating convictions under Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure § 8-301.1 if the vacatur itself was unlawful due to victim’s rights violations. A victim's representative has the right to reasonable notice, to attend in person, and to be heard on the merits of a vacatur motion, but not to participate as a full party.
Facts:
- On February 9, 1999, the body of Hae Min Lee was discovered buried in Leakin Park in Baltimore City.
- Adnan Syed, Hae Min Lee's ex-boyfriend, was charged with first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and false imprisonment.
- The State's key witness, Jay Wilds, testified that Adnan Syed confessed to murdering Hae Min Lee and that Wilds assisted in burying her body.
- On February 25, 2000, Adnan Syed was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and false imprisonment.
- In 2021, Assistant State’s Attorney Becky Feldman and Adnan Syed’s counsel, Erica Suter, began a joint investigation into the integrity of Syed’s convictions.
- During the joint investigation, Feldman discovered two handwritten documents in the State’s trial file detailing interviews with two alternative suspects who had possible motives to harm Hae Min Lee, information that Syed's counsel did not possess.
- On September 12, 2022, Feldman informed Young Lee, Hae Min Lee’s brother and the victim’s representative, that the State would be filing a motion to vacate Syed’s convictions and discussed the motion with him by phone the next day, stating there would be a hearing.
- On October 11, 2022, after DNA testing of Hae Min Lee’s clothing excluded Adnan Syed as a contributor, the State's Attorney entered a nolle prosequi of Syed’s vacated charges.
Procedural Posture:
- On February 25, 2000, Adnan Syed was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and false imprisonment in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
- The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed Syed’s convictions in an unreported opinion.
- In 2010, Syed filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
- The post-conviction court initially denied Syed's petition but later granted him a new trial on remand after the Appellate Court of Maryland granted his application for leave to appeal.
- The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the grant of a new trial.
- The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court's judgment, holding that Syed was not entitled to a new trial.
- On September 14, 2022, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City filed a motion to vacate Adnan Syed’s convictions in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
- On September 19, 2022, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted the State's motion to vacate Syed's convictions.
- On September 28, 2022, Young Lee, as the victim's representative, noted an appeal of the vacatur order to the Appellate Court of Maryland.
- On September 29, 2022, Lee filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and in the Appellate Court of Maryland to stay the proceedings pending appeal.
- On October 12, 2022, the Appellate Court of Maryland denied Lee’s motion to stay and ordered Lee to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as moot following the State's nolle prosequi.
- On November 4, 2022, the Appellate Court of Maryland ordered that the appeal would proceed.
- The Appellate Court of Maryland subsequently issued a reported opinion, vacating the Circuit Court's vacatur order, reinstating Syed's convictions, and remanding for a new vacatur hearing.
- Adnan Syed filed a motion for reconsideration with the Appellate Court of Maryland, which was denied.
- On May 24, 2023, Adnan Syed filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of Maryland, and on June 8, 2023, Young Lee filed a cross-petition for certiorari.
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Issue:
1. Does the State’s Attorney’s entry of a nolle prosequi moot a victim’s representative’s appeal of an order vacating a conviction if the vacatur was allegedly unlawful due to victim’s rights violations? 2. Does a victim’s representative have the right to be heard, including through counsel on the merits, at a hearing on a motion to vacate a conviction? 3. Does a victim’s representative have the right to attend a vacatur hearing in person, or does remote attendance satisfy this right? 4. Did Young Lee, as the victim’s representative, receive sufficient notice of the vacatur hearing to reasonably permit his in-person attendance? 5. Must a victim’s representative show prejudice to be entitled to a remedy for a violation of their rights at a vacatur hearing, and if so, did Young Lee make such a showing in this case?
Opinions:
Majority - Biran, J.
1. No, the entry of the nolle prosequi did not moot Young Lee’s appeal because the lawful vacatur of Adnan Syed’s convictions was a condition precedent to the State’s Attorney regaining the authority to nol pros the charges. A prosecutor cannot use the nol pros power to divest a victim of the right to appeal what they contend is an unlawful vacatur order. Citing State v. Simms (a nol pros cannot alter a final judgment) and Hook v. State (prosecutor's broad authority can be fettered by fundamental fairness), the Court found that if the vacatur was unlawful, the subsequent nol pros was a nullity. The case presents exceptional circumstances calling for a tempering of the State's broad nol pros authority to protect a victim's constitutionally protected rights under Article 47, which include an interest in the finality of a judgment. Furthermore, the Court noted that Maryland Rule 4-333(i) allows for "other appropriate action" beyond immediately scheduling a new trial or nol prossing, such as staying proceedings during a victim's appeal. 2. Yes, a victim’s representative has the right to be heard at a vacatur hearing, including on the merits of the motion and through counsel if represented. This right stems from Article 47(b) of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which grants victims a right "to be heard at a criminal justice proceeding, as these rights are implemented and the terms…are specified by law," and from CP § 11-403, which grants a right to be heard at hearings where the "alteration of a sentence…is considered." Vacating a conviction constitutes an ultimate alteration of a sentence. The cross-reference to CP § 11-403 in Maryland Rule 4-333(h), implementing the Vacatur Statute, further supports this. The Court reasoned that a victim’s input on the justice and fairness of vacating a conviction is fundamentally similar to their role at a sentencing or sentence modification hearing. Meaningful participation requires the right to speak after the parties' presentations and through counsel, to ensure a full adversarial airing of issues, especially when the State and defense are aligned. However, a victim does not have the right to participate as a party by calling witnesses or presenting evidence, as CP § 11-103(b) and Maryland Rule 8-111(c) explicitly state that a victim is not a party. 3. Yes, a victim’s representative has the right to attend a vacatur hearing in person if practicable, particularly because they also have a right to be heard at such a hearing. While technological advancements allow for remote attendance, the ordinary meaning of "attend" at the time CP § 11-102 (incorporated into the Vacatur Statute) was enacted contemplated in-person presence. Moreover, CP § 11-102(b)'s employment protection for job time lost due to attendance further suggests an expectation of in-person presence. The Court acknowledged that remote attendance might be appropriate if requested by the victim, during a public health emergency, or if in-person attendance would cause an inordinate delay. The circuit court's denial of a one-week postponement, based on a misunderstanding of Mr. Lee's prior statements and an incorrect belief that reasonable notice was not required, violated this right. 4. No, Young Lee did not receive sufficient notice to reasonably permit his in-person attendance. While the Vacatur Statute itself does not explicitly use the term "reasonable notice," the requirement for reasonableness is implicit in CP §§ 11-104(f) and 11-503, which govern victim notification for court proceedings. Notice must be sufficient to permit the victim to attend, including making necessary travel arrangements. The prosecutor provided less than one business day's notice of an in-person hearing to a victim's representative residing in California, failed to state the location of the hearing, and implied remote attendance was the only option. This was not reasonable. 5. Yes, a victim’s representative must demonstrate prejudice to be entitled to a remedy, but traditional harmless error analysis is inapplicable. Instead, the victim must show that the error prevented them from exercising their rights in a meaningful manner. Young Lee demonstrated prejudice because the lack of reasonable notice prevented him from timely engaging counsel, preparing a statement, requesting to see exhibits, and traveling to the hearing. The denial of a reasonable continuance forced remote attendance, diminishing the impact of his statement. Furthermore, being allowed to speak only before the parties' presentations, and not being able to address the merits or all evidence, prevented him from meaningfully exercising his right to be heard. The circuit court also erred by conducting an off-the-record in camera hearing to review evidence without notice to Lee.
Dissenting - Hotten, J.
1. Yes, the appeal by Young Lee was rendered moot by the State’s Attorney’s entry of a nolle prosequi. The State's power to nol pros is broad and its curtailment is limited to narrow circumstances involving a criminal defendant's rights (e.g., speedy trial, fair trial, appeal of a final judgment), not a victim's procedural rights. Once the circuit court vacated the conviction, there was no final judgment, restoring the State's authority to nol pros the charges. Article 47(c) explicitly states that nothing in the Article authorizes a victim to take any action to stay a criminal justice proceeding, meaning a stay could not have been granted. To force the State to reinstate charges would raise separation of powers concerns and interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused. 2. No, a victim’s representative does not have a right to be heard at a vacatur hearing. Article 47(b) states that the right to be heard exists "as these rights are implemented" by the General Assembly, and the Vacatur Statute (CP § 8-301.1) is silent on this right. While CP § 11-403 grants a right to be heard at a "sentencing or disposition hearing" where an "alteration of a sentence" is considered, vacating a conviction is not an "alteration of a sentence"; it concerns the validity of the conviction itself. The legislative history of the Vacatur Statute shows that concerns over the lack of a victim's right to be heard were raised, but the General Assembly deliberately chose not to include it. Maryland Rule 4-333's cross-reference to CP § 11-403 is merely a "highlight" and, under Rule 1-201(e), is not part of the rules themselves and thus does not create a substantive right. The circuit court also does not have the same broad discretion in a vacatur proceeding as it does in sentencing, making victim input less salient. 3. Yes, remote attendance via Zoom satisfied Young Lee’s right to attend the vacatur hearing. The right to "attend" in CP § 8-301.1(d)(2) and § 11-102(a) is not explicitly limited to in-person attendance, and it is qualified by "if practicable." Given that Mr. Lee resided in California, it was practicable for the court to allow remote attendance. The value of in-person attendance is diminished when an individual has only a right to attend but not to participate (e.g., speak or present evidence). The circuit court made efforts to ensure Mr. Lee's remote attendance. 4. Yes, Young Lee received reasonable notice of the vacatur hearing, sufficient for his remote attendance. The purpose of notice is to enable attendance, and Mr. Lee did, in fact, attend remotely. The notice period, while short for in-person travel, was sufficient for him to prepare for and participate via Zoom. Any technical deficiencies in the notice's content did not prevent him from exercising his right to attend, as he was well-informed by the State's Attorney throughout the process.
Dissenting - Booth, J.
1. Yes, the appeal was rendered moot by the State’s Attorney’s entry of a nol pros following the grant of the State’s vacatur motion, and the nol pros was not a legal nullity. The State’s Attorneys have broad, constitutionally derived discretionary powers in charging decisions, including the authority to enter a nol pros before a final judgment. The vacatur of Syed's conviction, even if flawed, meant there was no final judgment when the nol pros was entered. To limit this discretion based on a victim's rights would be an impermissible encroachment into prosecutorial and legislative functions, turning the principles of Simms and Hook on their head, as those cases centered on a criminal defendant’s paramount liberty interests. 2. No, a victim’s representative does not have a constitutional, statutory, or rule-based right to be heard at a vacatur hearing. Article 47 did not establish a self-executing substantive right to be heard, but rather directed the General Assembly to "implement" these rights and specify the "certain circumstances" in which they apply. The General Assembly, through statutes like the Vacatur Statute (CP § 8-301.1), the actual innocence statute (CP § 8-301), and JUVRA (CP § 8-110), has consistently chosen not to include a victim’s right to address the court in proceedings that grant relief to convicted individuals, even when alerted to this omission. CP § 11-403 applies specifically to "sentencing or disposition hearings" and does not extend to vacatur hearings, which concern the validity of a conviction, not the severity or alteration of a sentence. This Court's own Rule 4-333 implementing the Vacatur Statute does not grant a right to be heard, and Rule 1-201(e) explicitly states that cross-references (like the one to CP § 11-403) are not part of the rules and do not create substantive rights. The Majority's decision to create such a right, especially a broad right to participate in the merits, oversteps judicial authority and intrudes into the legislative domain, potentially impacting the constitutionality of several statutes without proper briefing. 3. Yes, Young Lee’s remote attendance via Zoom satisfied his right to attend the vacatur hearing. The right to "attend" must be viewed in context; where there is no right to be heard, the importance of in-person attendance is diminished. The circuit court took careful steps to facilitate Mr. Lee's remote attendance despite the logistical challenges of his residence in California. Remote technology is now a reliable means for court proceedings, and there were no issues with Mr. Lee's ability to hear or view the hearing. 4. Yes, Young Lee received reasonable notice. The State took significant efforts to keep Mr. Lee informed, including providing a draft of the motion to vacate and confirming his ability to attend remotely. While the notice was short for in-person travel, it was reasonable and adequate for remote attendance, which was how Mr. Lee ultimately participated. Any minor technical deficiencies in the notice did not prevent him from exercising his right to attend the proceeding.
Analysis:
This case significantly expands victims' rights in Maryland, particularly concerning participation in post-conviction proceedings. By holding that a nol pros does not moot a victim's appeal when vacatur is challenged, the Court creates a powerful mechanism for victims to enforce their procedural rights, potentially prolonging uncertainty for defendants whose convictions have been vacated. The ruling clarifies that Article 47 of the Declaration of Rights is not merely aspirational but mandates substantive rights (notice, attendance, to be heard) in new criminal justice proceedings unless impracticability is explicitly found. This will likely lead to increased victim participation and potential delays in similar post-conviction relief cases, emphasizing the need for courts to carefully balance defendants' liberty interests with victims' procedural rights from the outset of such proceedings.
