Swanson Ex Rel. Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School District No. I-L
1998 Colo. J. C.A.R. 725, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1259, 135 F.3d 694 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
A neutral, generally applicable law that incidentally burdens a particular religious practice does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. To trigger heightened scrutiny under a "hybrid-rights" theory, a plaintiff must make a colorable claim of infringement on a recognized constitutional right in addition to the free exercise claim, not merely invoke a general right.
Facts:
- Annie Swanson's parents home-schooled her for religious reasons, specifically to incorporate Christian principles into her education.
- Upon reaching seventh grade, her parents decided she would benefit from taking specific classes at the public school, such as foreign language and science, which they felt the public school could teach more effectively.
- The then-superintendent permitted Annie to attend two public school classes on a part-time basis for nine weeks, during which she performed well and caused no disruption.
- The following year, a new superintendent, Bowman, was hired and refused to allow Annie to continue attending part-time for eighth grade.
- The Guthrie Board of Education then formally adopted a policy requiring all students to enroll on a full-time basis.
- The policy contained exceptions for fifth-year seniors and special education students, categories for which the school district received state financial aid for part-time attendance.
- The board stated the policy was based on financial concerns, as it did not receive state aid for other part-time students and feared setting a precedent that would strain its resources.
Procedural Posture:
- Annie Swanson and her parents sued the Guthrie Independent School District and its superintendent in the United States District Court.
- The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Free Exercise Clause and their constitutional right to direct their child's education, among other claims.
- Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion for a preliminary injunction.
- The district court denied the plaintiffs' motions and granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants (the school district).
- The Swansons (Plaintiffs) appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a public school district's policy requiring all students to enroll on a full-time basis, which is neutral and generally applicable, violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment or the constitutional right of parents to direct their children's education when it prevents a religiously home-schooled student from attending on a part-time basis?
Opinions:
Majority - Black, District Judge
No, the school district's policy does not violate the Constitution. A neutral law of general applicability does not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if it incidentally burdens a religious practice. The school board's full-time enrollment policy applies to all students, whether home-schooled for religious or secular reasons, and its exceptions are based on state funding categories, not religious criteria. Therefore, under the standard set in Employment Div. v. Smith, the policy is constitutional and does not require justification by a compelling governmental interest. The plaintiffs' 'hybrid-rights' claim also fails because they have not demonstrated a colorable infringement of their parental right to direct their child's education; this right is not absolute and does not empower parents to compel a public school to offer its curriculum on an a la carte basis against a neutral enrollment policy.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high threshold for challenging neutral, generally applicable laws under the Free Exercise Clause after Employment Div. v. Smith. It significantly clarifies the 'hybrid-rights' exception mentioned in Smith, establishing that a plaintiff cannot simply pair a free exercise claim with a general assertion of another right (like parental rights) to trigger strict scrutiny. Instead, the plaintiff must show a colorable, independent constitutional violation of that companion right. This ruling solidifies the authority of local school boards to set uniform enrollment policies based on legitimate administrative and financial concerns, even if those policies conflict with the educational preferences of parents acting on religious convictions.
