Swain v. Alabama
380 U.S. 202 (1965)
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Rule of Law:
The use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a particular race from serving on a jury in a single case does not, by itself, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, a defendant must show that the prosecutor has systematically, over a period of time, used peremptory strikes to prevent all members of that race from serving on any petit jury.
Facts:
- Robert Swain, a Black man, was accused of raping a white girl in Talladega County, Alabama.
- In Talladega County, Black males over 21 constituted 26% of the male population eligible for jury service.
- From 1953 until Swain's trial, jury venires (panels) in the county were consistently composed of only 10% to 15% Black members.
- Within the memory of living persons, no Black individual had ever served on a petit (trial) jury in any civil or criminal case in Talladega County.
- For Swain's trial, the petit jury venire included eight Black individuals.
- Two of the Black venire members were exempt for reasons unrelated to the case.
- The prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove the remaining six Black individuals from the jury pool.
- Swain was ultimately tried, convicted, and sentenced to death by an all-white jury.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Swain was indicted for rape in the Circuit Court of Talladega County, Alabama, a state trial court.
- Swain filed motions to quash the indictment and strike the trial jury venire, alleging invidious racial discrimination in the jury selection process, which the trial court denied.
- Following a trial, an all-white jury convicted Swain and sentenced him to death.
- Swain appealed his conviction to the Alabama Supreme Court, the state's highest court.
- The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and conviction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.
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Issue:
Does a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike all prospective Black jurors from the petit jury venire in a particular criminal case violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice White
No, a prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes to remove all Black jurors in a particular case does not, on its own, violate the Equal Protection Clause. The historical purpose of the peremptory challenge is to allow both sides to remove potential jurors for any reason, without inquiry or judicial control, to secure what they believe is a fair and impartial jury. There is a strong presumption that in any given case, the prosecutor is using strikes for legitimate, trial-related reasons, not for purposeful discrimination. This presumption is not overcome merely by showing that all Black jurors were struck in the defendant's specific case. However, a constitutional claim might arise if a defendant could prove that a prosecutor, in case after case, systematically used peremptory challenges to prevent any Black individuals from ever serving on a jury in that county. In this instance, Swain failed to carry his burden of proof to demonstrate such a systematic and historical pattern of exclusion by the prosecutor's office.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Goldberg
Yes, the prosecutor's actions violate the Equal Protection Clause. The undisputed fact that no Black person had ever served on a petit jury in the history of Talladega County establishes a prima facie case of systematic racial exclusion. Under established precedent like Norris v. Alabama and Patton v. Mississippi, this showing should shift the burden to the State to provide a non-racial justification for this total exclusion. The State fails to meet this burden by simply pointing to its peremptory challenge system. The Court wrongly prioritizes the non-constitutional right of peremptory challenge over the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection and creates an impossibly high burden of proof for defendants, effectively condoning discriminatory practices.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Harlan
Yes, the majority opinion is correct, but it is important to emphasize that the Court explicitly reserves the question of what legal standard would apply if a defendant presented a record that did, in fact, demonstrate a prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges over time to exclude a racial group from jury service. The Court's discussion of that potential claim is not a ruling on the merits of such a case, as that issue is not presented by the record here.
Analysis:
Swain v. Alabama established an extremely high evidentiary bar for defendants claiming racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. By requiring proof of a historical pattern of systematic exclusion across numerous cases, the ruling made it nearly impossible for defendants to succeed on such a claim, thereby insulating individual prosecutors' actions from Equal Protection scrutiny. This decision, often criticized for creating a "crippling burden of proof," prioritized the traditional, unfettered use of peremptory challenges over anti-discrimination principles. Its precedent stood for two decades until it was effectively overturned by Batson v. Kentucky (1986), which held that a defendant could establish a prima facie case based on the prosecutor's actions in their own case alone.
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