Sutherland v. Peterson's Oil Service, Inc.

Majority - Rikelman, Circuit Judge

Yes, a temporary, but severe, knee injury can qualify as a 'disability' under the ADAAA, and Sutherland presented sufficient evidence for his disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate claims to survive summary judgment, but his wrongful termination claim based on public policy regarding biofuel fails. The court vacated the district court's summary judgment on Sutherland's ADA discrimination and retaliation claims, and his Massachusetts state-law disability discrimination and failure to accommodate claims, while affirming summary judgment on his wrongful termination claim. For the disability-related claims, the court reasoned that Congress enacted the ADAAA to broadly construe 'disability,' expressly rejecting prior strict interpretations. This means a temporary injury can qualify if sufficiently severe, as there is no six-month duration requirement. Sutherland's knee injury, involving torn meniscus and patella damage, caused 'excruciating pain' and swelling over several months, meeting the standard for an 'actual disability' or a 'record of disability.' His detailed contemporaneous accounts of pain were sufficient for a lay jury without additional medical evidence. Peterson's awareness of his impairment also satisfied the 'regarded as' disabled standard under the ADAAA, which does not require proving the impairment limits a major life activity. A genuine dispute of material fact existed regarding whether installation work and night shifts were 'essential functions' of his job, given his pre-hire agreement and evidence of other technicians not performing both, making him potentially a 'qualified individual.' The temporal proximity between Sutherland being cleared to return to work on April 20, 2020, and his effective termination date on the same day, was sufficient for a jury to infer a causal connection to his disability for the adverse employment action element. Sutherland's retaliation claim is distinct from the failure-to-accommodate claim and does not depend on whether his knee injury fully qualified as a disability. A jury could find Peterson's retaliated against him for seeking accommodations, even if they initially granted some. For the failure-to-accommodate claim, the district court erred by stating Sutherland's requests predated the doctor's note, as his November text clearly linked his request to his knee injury. Furthermore, his pre-hire terms (no installations/night shifts) were separate from his disability accommodation requests. His request for a reduced-hour schedule was reasonable on its face, as 'part-time or modified work schedules' are recognized accommodations under the ADA, and Peterson's own handbook defined part-time employees and had them on staff. Peterson's failure to formally respond or engage in an interactive process could also be evidence of a statutory violation. Conversely, the court affirmed summary judgment on Sutherland's wrongful termination claim based on alleged violation of public policy. Under Massachusetts law, this exception to at-will employment is narrow, typically requiring a clear public policy rooted in statutes or government regulations. Sutherland's complaints about 'Clean Heat' biofuel were based on his personal experience and maintenance manuals, not a well-defined public policy. The state's investigation found consumer fraud but no safety-related violations, distinguishing it from cases where employees reported violations of clear public safety codes (e.g., electrical or plumbing codes).