Sussex County, Del. v. Morris
1992 Del. LEXIS 233, 610 A.2d 1354 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
Governmental immunity for discretionary functions under the County and Municipal Tort Claims Act does not extend to a county's liability for a constable's negligent ministerial acts, particularly when those acts involve the use of a motor vehicle that is ill-equipped for a specific transportation duty, and the constable is found to be acting as the county's agent.
Facts:
- On July 16, 1984, E. Stanley Morris was released from the Delaware State Hospital after a 12-day involuntary civil commitment, having been diagnosed with alcohol dependence, psychosis, schizophrenia, and paranoia.
- Less than 24 hours later, on July 17, 1984, Morris was again involuntarily committed to the State Hospital for 72 hours and was held at Milford Memorial Hospital pending transfer.
- An employee at Milford Memorial Hospital contacted Frank Blake, Jr., one of several Sussex constables responsible for transporting mental patients, to complete Morris's transfer.
- Blake arrived at Milford Memorial Hospital driving his personal 1981 4-door Oldsmobile, which had not been modified and thus had fully operational rear door locks and handles, unlike a typical police car.
- Blake handcuffed Morris's hands in front (at Morris's request so he could smoke) and shackled his legs, placing him in the back seat with his seat belt fastened.
- During the trip, Morris stated several times that he wished he were dead, then unexpectedly unfastened his seat belt, unlocked the car door, opened the door, and jumped out of the moving car.
- Morris sustained serious injuries, including a 45% permanent impairment of one foot, a limp, and an inability to return to his former construction work.
- Evidence suggested Morris was experiencing a psychotic episode when he jumped from the car.
Procedural Posture:
- E. Stanley Morris sued Frank Blake, Jr., Sussex County, Delaware, and the City of Milford for injuries sustained.
- Summary judgment was granted to the City of Milford.
- Blake's motion for summary judgment was granted as to allegations of simple negligence, but denied as to wantonness.
- Sussex County's motion for summary judgment was granted only as to its alleged failure to adequately train and equip Blake, but denied on the issues of governmental immunity and agency.
- Sussex County again moved for summary judgment after the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Sadler v. New Castle County, which the Superior Court denied.
- Before trial, Sussex County filed a motion in limine concerning the admissibility of certain medical expenses, claiming Morris was eligible for $25,000 in personal injury protection (PIP) coverage; the trial court, however, admitted the hospital bill with only a $9,870 reduction (the amount Morris netted from a disputed PIP claim settlement).
- At the close of trial, Sussex County moved for a directed verdict, claiming Blake was not an agent of the County; the trial court reserved decision.
- The jury returned a general verdict against Sussex County, and in Morris’ favor, of $100,000.
- Sussex County moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial (both based on the agency issue), and also sought a remittitur of $15,130; all these motions were denied by the trial court.
- Sussex County appealed the trial court's decision to the Delaware Supreme Court.
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Issue:
1. Does governmental immunity under the County and Municipal Tort Claims Act, specifically the discretionary function exception, protect Sussex County from liability for its constable's negligent ministerial acts involving the use of an ill-equipped motor vehicle to transport a mentally ill patient? 2. Was the constable acting as an agent of Sussex County during the incident?
Opinions:
Majority - Moore, Justice
Yes, governmental immunity does not protect Sussex County in this instance, and yes, Blake was acting as an agent of Sussex County. The Court affirmed the jury's finding that Blake was Sussex County's agent and that his actions were ministerial, thus falling outside the scope of governmental immunity. The Court adopted the definition of a ministerial act from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D cmt. h, defining it as an act involving 'less in the way of personal decision or judgment or the matter for which judgment is required has little bearing of importance upon the validity of the act.' The selection and equipment of the car Blake used were deemed ministerial acts because they had little bearing on the validity of his official conduct of transporting a patient. The Court distinguished this case from Sadler v. New Castle County, explaining that here, Morris's injuries were a direct result of 'what was used'—an ill-equipped car—rather than 'how' something was used. The Court found that the motor vehicle exception to immunity under 10 Del.C. § 4012(1) applied because the improperly equipped automobile was the instrument of harm. Furthermore, the Court upheld the jury's finding of agency, citing evidence that Sussex processed Blake’s application, appointed him knowing his duties, notified hospitals of his availability, provided a badge, and retained disciplinary power. While acknowledging an error in the trial court's remittitur ruling regarding PIP coverage, the Court deemed it harmless given the $100,000 general verdict.
Dissenting - Horsey, Justice
No, governmental immunity should protect Sussex County, as Blake's actions were discretionary, and the question of agency is secondary. Justice Horsey argued that the majority unnecessarily confuses the interaction of 10 Del.C. §§ 4011 and 4012, asserting that Section 4011(b) grants immunity 'notwithstanding' the specific exceptions of Section 4012. Therefore, if Blake's actions were discretionary, immunity should apply regardless of whether a motor vehicle was involved. The dissent contended that the majority's use of 'ministerial' (a term not in the statute) to classify Blake's actions was an attempt to resurrect common law distinctions the statute aimed to abrogate. Horsey, Justice, argued that Blake's decisions regarding the manner and method of transporting and securing Morris, including the choice of vehicle and the decision to handcuff Morris in front, were inherently discretionary, as he had 'little choice as to when, where, how or under what circumstances their acts are to be done' (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 895D, comment h, but emphasizing the 'little choice' aspect). The dissent concluded that absent particularized jury findings as to which of Blake's acts negligently caused the injuries, a holding that any allegedly negligent act was discretionary should result in reversal, emphasizing that Blake's actions were 'inseparable and discretionary.'
Concurring - Yeasey, Chief Justice
Yes, governmental immunity does not protect Sussex County, and yes, Blake was acting as an agent of Sussex County. Chief Justice Yeasey concurred in the result and the majority's holding that Blake's decisions—such as transporting Morris in his unequipped personal car and handcuffing him in front—were ministerial and not 'discretionary functions' under 10 Del.C. § 4011(b)(3). He agreed that the case was distinguishable from Sadler v. New Castle County. Chief Justice Yeasey emphasized that policy issues inherent in balancing governmental immunity with redress for torts are legislative, not judicial. While acknowledging the difficulty in defining 'discretionary function,' he noted that future cases might consider reexamining Sadler and consulting Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) precedent, which distinguishes between policy/planning and operational level acts, but found it unnecessary to do so in this case.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the distinction between 'discretionary' and 'ministerial' acts within the context of governmental immunity under the Delaware County and Municipal Tort Claims Act. By adopting the Restatement's definition, the Court provides a framework for future cases to assess whether government employee actions, even those involving some choice, are ministerial enough to strip immunity. The ruling reinforces that the motor vehicle exception to immunity can apply not only when a vehicle is mechanically defective, but also when it is inappropriately or ill-equipped for the specific task at hand, thus being the direct instrument of harm. The case also underscores the importance of agency principles in determining governmental liability for the actions of individuals who may not be direct employees but perform functions on behalf of the government.
