Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman
101 L. Ed. 2d 56, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 2746, 487 U.S. 59 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
A state's residency requirement for admission to its bar on motion, which waives the bar examination for experienced attorneys, violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Facts:
- Myrna E. Friedman was an attorney licensed and in good standing with the Illinois Bar (1977) and the District of Columbia Bar (1980).
- From 1977 until early 1986, Friedman lived in Virginia and worked as an attorney in the Arlington, VA and Washington, D.C. area.
- In January 1986, she became associate general counsel for a corporation, maintaining her office and practicing law full-time at the company's headquarters in Vienna, Virginia.
- In February 1986, Friedman married and moved her residence to Cheverly, Maryland, though she continued to work in Virginia.
- In June 1986, Friedman applied for admission to the Virginia Bar 'on motion,' a process that allows experienced attorneys to be admitted without taking the bar exam.
- Virginia's Supreme Court Rule 1A:1 conditioned eligibility for admission on motion on the applicant being a 'permanent resident of the Commonwealth.'
- Because she was no longer a resident of Virginia, her application was denied.
Procedural Posture:
- Myrna Friedman's application for admission to the Virginia Bar on motion was denied by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Virginia because she was not a resident.
- Friedman filed suit against the Supreme Court of Virginia in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging the residency requirement was unconstitutional.
- The District Court entered summary judgment in Friedman's favor.
- The Supreme Court of Virginia, as appellant, appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment, finding the rule violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
- The Supreme Court of Virginia appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which noted probable jurisdiction.
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Issue:
Does a state rule that permits qualified attorneys licensed in other states to be admitted to its bar without examination only if they are permanent residents of that state violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kennedy
Yes. A state rule conditioning admission to the bar on motion upon residency violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Clause is implicated whenever a state does not permit qualified nonresidents to practice law within its borders on terms of substantial equality with its own residents. The court applied its two-step analysis for the Privileges and Immunities Clause. First, the court determined that the opportunity to practice law, including admission on motion, is a fundamental privilege protected by the Clause. Denying nonresidents the chance to be admitted on motion, while offering it to residents, is not 'substantial equality.' Second, the court found Virginia's justifications for the discriminatory rule were not substantial and the rule was not closely related to achieving them. Virginia argued the rule ensured attorneys would have commitment to the state and facilitated enforcement of a full-time practice requirement. The court rejected these, stating that a nonresident working full-time in Virginia has a substantial stake in the state's legal practice and that less restrictive means, like requiring an in-state office (which Virginia already did), could achieve the state's objectives without discriminating based on residency.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No. The residency requirement for admission on motion does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Reaffirming his dissent in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, the Chief Justice argued that the Clause should not prevent states from considering residency when admitting lawyers, as the legal profession is distinct from other commercial activities. The dissent contended that Virginia's rule was an 'ameliorative provision' designed to ease the burden on new residents who are experienced attorneys. By striking it down, the Court penalizes Virginia for offering this accommodation and may incentivize states to eliminate reciprocal admission on motion altogether, which would be a detriment to the mobility of lawyers.
Analysis:
This decision extends the Court's holding in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, which barred residency requirements for applicants taking a state's bar exam. Friedman applies this principle to the alternative admission process of 'admission on motion,' solidifying that the practice of law is a fundamental privilege protected from residency-based discrimination. The case reinforces that any state-imposed distinction between residents and nonresidents regarding the legal profession must survive heightened scrutiny. It requires states to justify such discrimination with substantial reasons and demonstrate that the discriminatory practice is closely tailored, considering less restrictive alternatives.
