Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.
1969 U.S. LEXIS 8, 24 L. Ed. 2d 386, 396 U.S. 229 (1969)
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Rule of Law:
42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibits private racial discrimination in property-related transactions, including the assignment of a community recreational membership tied to a lease. A white property owner who is punished for advocating for the § 1982 rights of a Black person has standing to sue under the statute.
Facts:
- Little Hunting Park, Inc., a Virginia corporation, operated a community park and playground for residents of a specific area in Fairfax County.
- Membership was open to homeowners in the area, and the bylaws allowed a member to assign their membership share to a tenant when renting out their home, subject to board approval.
- Paul E. Sullivan, a white homeowner and member of the park, leased one of his houses in the area to T. R. Freeman, Jr., a Black man.
- Sullivan attempted to assign his membership share to Freeman as part of the lease arrangement.
- The board of directors of Little Hunting Park refused to approve the assignment specifically because Freeman was Black.
- Sullivan protested the board's racially discriminatory decision.
- In response to his protests, the board voted to expel Sullivan from the corporation.
Procedural Posture:
- Paul E. Sullivan and T. R. Freeman, Jr. sued Little Hunting Park, Inc. in a Virginia state trial court, seeking injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982.
- The Virginia trial court dismissed the complaints.
- The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, the state's highest court, refused to hear the appeal, citing a procedural defect regarding notice for tendering the trial transcript.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Virginia court's judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Jones v. Mayer Co.
- On remand, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia again adhered to its prior position and refused the appeals based on the same procedural rule.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari for a second time.
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Issue:
Does 42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibit a private community recreation association from refusing to approve a membership share assignment to a Black person in connection with a property lease, and from retaliating against a white member who protests such discrimination?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Douglas
Yes, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibits such discrimination and retaliation. The statute bars all racial discrimination, private and public, in property transactions. The recreational membership share was part of the leasehold interest, and refusing to approve its assignment to Freeman interfered with his right to 'lease' property on equal terms. Citing Jones v. Mayer Co., the court held that § 1982 must be interpreted broadly to fulfill the Thirteenth Amendment's promise of freedom. Furthermore, Sullivan has standing to sue because punishing him for trying to vindicate Freeman's rights would undermine the statute's purpose. Citing Barrows v. Jackson, the Court noted that a white owner is sometimes the 'only effective adversary' of discrimination. Federal courts are empowered to fashion appropriate remedies, including damages, to vindicate federally protected rights.
Dissenting - Justice Harlan
No, the Court should not decide this case under § 1982. The majority is unwisely expanding a vague, 100-year-old statute when Congress has recently enacted the comprehensive Fair Housing Act of 1968, which provides a detailed and modern statutory framework for addressing this exact type of discrimination. The Court should defer to the specific remedies and procedures established by Congress in the new law rather than creating a 'common law of forbidden racial discriminations' under § 1982. By intervening, the Court is forced to imply remedies like damages and create standards for standing that Congress did not provide in the original statute. The writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expanded the practical application of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 in the wake of Jones v. Mayer Co. It clarified that the statute's protection of the right to 'lease' property extends beyond the physical dwelling to include ancillary rights and privileges, such as access to community facilities. Most importantly, it established third-party standing for individuals who suffer retaliation for advocating on behalf of those whose § 1982 rights have been violated, thereby strengthening the statute's enforcement by protecting allies against reprisal. This precedent ensures that those who stand against housing discrimination are not chilled into silence by fear of economic or social punishment.
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