Suliveres v. Commonwealth
449 Mass. 112, 865 N.E.2d 1086, 2007 Mass. LEXIS 279 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
Under Massachusetts law, consent to sexual intercourse obtained through fraud or deceit does not constitute rape, as fraud cannot substitute for the statute's mandatory element of compulsion 'by force.'
Facts:
- The complainant and her longtime boyfriend shared a bedroom.
- The defendant is the brother of the complainant's boyfriend.
- One night, while the complainant was asleep alone in her darkened bedroom, the defendant entered the room.
- The complainant awoke and, assuming the man was her boyfriend, addressed him by her boyfriend's name.
- The defendant got into bed with the complainant and they engaged in sexual intercourse.
- During the act, the complainant believed she was having intercourse with her boyfriend.
- The complainant later stated that had she known the man's true identity was the defendant, she 'would have never consented.'
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was indicted for rape and tried before a jury in the Massachusetts Superior Court.
- At the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence, the defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty was denied.
- The jury was unable to reach a verdict, and the trial judge declared a mistrial.
- The defendant then moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that insufficient evidence had been presented and a retrial would violate double jeopardy principles.
- The trial court judge denied the motion to dismiss.
- The defendant sought relief from a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, who then reserved and reported the case to the full court for decision.
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Issue:
Does obtaining consent to sexual intercourse by fraudulently impersonating the complainant's boyfriend constitute rape under G. L. c. 265, § 22, which defines the crime as compelling a person to submit 'by force and against his will'?
Opinions:
Majority - Cowin, J.
No. Obtaining consent to sexual intercourse by impersonating another person does not constitute rape under G. L. c. 265, § 22, because such fraudulent inducement cannot satisfy the statute's mandatory element of 'force.' The court reaffirms its precedent set in Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, which held that fraud cannot supply the place of force, a distinct and independent element of the crime of rape. The Massachusetts rape statute requires that the intercourse be compelled 'by force' and be 'against the will' of the victim; lack of true consent is not synonymous with the use of force. The court reasoned that since the Legislature has had nearly fifty years to amend the statute to overrule Goldenberg and has not done so, despite multiple amendments to the rape law, it is the Legislature's prerogative, not the court's, to change this established definition. The court also rejected the argument that this case involved 'fraud in the factum' (deceit about the act itself), finding instead that it was 'fraud in the inducement' (deceit about the surrounding circumstances), as the complainant knew she was consenting to a sexual act.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms a strict, traditional interpretation of rape that requires proof of physical force, explicitly separating it from situations where consent is procured through deception. By deferring to the legislature, the court highlights the doctrine of legislative supremacy and judicial restraint in criminal law. The ruling exposes a potential gap in the law where a non-consensual sexual act, induced by significant fraud, does not meet the statutory definition of rape, potentially prompting legislative action to create a new offense or amend the existing statute to reflect a more modern understanding of sexual autonomy and consent.
