Suarez v. City of Texas City
465 S.W.3d 623, 58 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1259, 2015 Tex. LEXIS 578 (2015)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
To establish gross negligence and waive a municipality's governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act and recreational use statute, a plaintiff must provide legally sufficient evidence that the municipality had actual, subjective awareness of a specific, extreme risk of harm beyond the dangers inherent in the recreational activity, and proceeded with conscious indifference.
Facts:
- The Texas City Dike is a 5.4-mile man-made peninsula owned and operated by Texas City for public recreation.
- Over many years, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers deposited dredged material along the Dike, which formed a man-made beach.
- Prior to Hurricane Ike in 2008, Texas City had posted signs along the Dike warning of dangers including undertows, wakes from ships, rip currents, and sinkholes.
- In September 2008, Hurricane Ike destroyed or damaged all of these warning signs.
- After repairing the Dike, Texas City reopened it to the public in 2010 but did not replace the specific warning signs about rip currents and sinkholes, only installing monument signs at boat ramps with general 'No Swimming' warnings.
- On October 3, 2010, Edith and Hector Suarez visited the man-made beach with their nine-year-old twin daughters.
- While wading in knee-deep water, the twin girls were unexpectedly swept into deeper water by strong, turbulent currents.
- Hector Suarez attempted a rescue, but he and both of his daughters drowned.
Procedural Posture:
- Edith Suarez sued Texas City in a Texas state trial court for negligence and gross negligence.
- Texas City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting governmental immunity, and a motion for summary judgment.
- The trial court denied Texas City's plea to the jurisdiction.
- Texas City, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's denial to the Texas Court of Appeals, First District.
- The court of appeals reversed the trial court's order and rendered judgment dismissing Suarez's claims for lack of jurisdiction.
- Suarez, as the petitioner, sought review in the Supreme Court of Texas, which had jurisdiction due to a dissenting opinion on rehearing in the court of appeals.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a municipality's knowledge of general, inherent risks associated with open-water swimming, evidenced by prior warning signs that were not replaced after a hurricane and a vague history of previous drownings, constitute legally sufficient evidence of actual, subjective awareness of an extreme and latent risk of harm sufficient to establish gross negligence and waive governmental immunity?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Guzman
No. A municipality's awareness of general risks inherent in a recreational activity does not constitute evidence of actual, subjective awareness of a specific, extreme peril as required to prove gross negligence and waive immunity. To survive a plea to the jurisdiction, a plaintiff must present more than a scintilla of evidence showing the governmental entity had subjective knowledge of the specific dangerous condition that caused the injury. Here, the evidence presented by Suarez—including the pre-hurricane warning signs, the absence of a designated swim area, a vague history of prior drownings, and the mayor’s testimony—was equally consistent with knowledge of general marine hazards as it was with knowledge of the specific, latent risk alleged by Suarez’s expert. Such circumstantial evidence, which supports multiple, equally probable inferences, amounts to mere surmise or suspicion and is legally 'no evidence' of the required subjective awareness. Because Suarez failed to raise a fact issue on the subjective component of gross negligence, Texas City retained its governmental immunity.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces governmental immunity for municipalities under the Texas recreational use statute by setting a high evidentiary bar for the 'actual, subjective awareness' prong of the gross negligence test. It clarifies that plaintiffs cannot rely on circumstantial evidence that only points to a government's knowledge of general, inherent dangers associated with a recreational area. The ruling requires plaintiffs to produce specific evidence linking the governmental entity's knowledge to the particular, latent peril that caused the injury, making it more difficult to overcome a plea to the jurisdiction in premises liability cases against the government.
