Sturgeon v. Quarterman
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40382, 2009 WL 1351045, 615 F. Supp. 2d 546 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
The failure of defense counsel to object to an exculpatory witness's invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel when valid legal grounds exist to compel the witness's testimony, such as an expired statute of limitations or a prior plea agreement that would bar re-prosecution.
Facts:
- On December 25, 1998, Minh Nguy was robbed at gunpoint in his driveway by two men.
- Nguy described his primary assailant to police as being approximately six feet tall with a goatee.
- Later that day, Richard Glen Sturgeon was arrested while driving a car with Elvin Bonner and Gregory Tobias. Nguy's stolen property was found in Tobias's possession, and a pistol was found on Bonner.
- At the time of his arrest, Sturgeon was five feet, eight inches tall and had a full mustache and a goatee.
- Nguy identified Sturgeon in a police lineup and at trial as the man who pistol-whipped him.
- At Sturgeon's second trial, the defense called Elvin Bonner, who was prepared to testify that he participated in the robbery but that Sturgeon was not involved and was innocent.
- The prosecutor informed the court that prior aggravated robbery charges against Bonner had been dismissed without prejudice and could be re-filed if he gave incriminating testimony.
- Bonner then invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify, fearing prosecution, even though the five-year statute of limitations for the robbery had expired.
Procedural Posture:
- Richard Glen Sturgeon was convicted of aggravated robbery by a jury in the 182nd District Court of Harris County, Texas (a state trial court).
- On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (the state's highest criminal court) reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.
- Following a second trial, Sturgeon was again convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery.
- Sturgeon appealed the second conviction, and the intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals then dismissed his petition for discretionary review.
- Sturgeon filed several state applications for a writ of habeas corpus, all of which were dismissed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on procedural grounds without a review of the merits.
- Sturgeon then filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
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Issue:
Does a defense attorney's failure to object to a key exculpatory witness's invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, when valid legal grounds for such an objection exist, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Atlas, District Judge
Yes, the defense attorney's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Here, counsel's performance was deficient for failing to object to Elvin Bonner's invocation of the Fifth Amendment on at least two valid grounds. First, the five-year statute of limitations for the aggravated robbery had expired, meaning Bonner faced no real threat of prosecution and could not validly claim the privilege. Second, refiling charges against Bonner would likely have violated due process by breaching the plea agreement under which the original charges were dismissed. Counsel's failure to research or raise these meritorious objections fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. This deficiency caused actual prejudice because the state's case rested almost entirely on a single, questionable eyewitness identification with significant inconsistencies. Bonner's exculpatory testimony was crucial, and there is a reasonable probability that its admission would have changed the outcome of the trial.
Analysis:
This decision provides a clear application of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, emphasizing counsel's duty to overcome improper procedural hurdles preventing exculpatory testimony. It highlights that an attorney's obligation extends beyond merely identifying a witness to include making necessary legal arguments to ensure the witness can testify. The case also underscores the critical interplay between claims of ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct, showing how a prosecutor's threat to a witness, combined with counsel's failure to counter it, can create a powerful basis for habeas relief, particularly in cases that hinge on weak or uncorroborated eyewitness testimony.
