Sturgell v. Taylor
295 SW 2d 800 (1956)
Rule of Law:
A party that objects to testimony about a transaction with a deceased person waives that objection if the party then elicits the same testimony on cross-examination, thereby rendering the testimony admissible.
Facts:
- In 1935, the plaintiffs' predecessor in title conveyed a tract of land to John Taylor.
- The 1935 deed described the property's starting point with reference to the 'James A. Tracy line,' which could not be positively identified.
- One of the plaintiffs testified that the original grantor and John Taylor had orally agreed upon the boundary's starting point.
- About a year after the conveyance, Taylor leased an adjacent parcel of land (the disputed tract) from the same grantor.
- The lease described the western boundary of the leased property as starting at the 'John W. Taylor line at his home place,' which appeared to be the same boundary the plaintiffs claimed for the original deed.
- A year after the lease, the grantor sold land to the east of the disputed tract to a Mr. Cline, who testified that he understood his property line was adjacent to the land Taylor had leased, not the land Taylor had bought.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants in a Pike County trial court to determine the title to a strip of land.
- The case was tried before a judge without a jury.
- At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' presentation of evidence, the defendants made a motion for judgment.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motion and entered judgment in their favor.
- The plaintiffs (appellants) appealed the trial court's judgment to the state's intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a party waive an objection to testimony concerning a transaction with a deceased person when that party elicits the same testimony on cross-examination?
Opinions:
Majority - Clay, Commissioner
Yes. A party waives their objection to testimony regarding a transaction with a deceased person by eliciting that same evidence on cross-examination. Although the trial court initially sustained an objection to the plaintiff's testimony about an agreement with the deceased John Taylor, the defendants waived this objection by questioning the witness about the same agreement during cross-examination, which rendered the testimony admissible. This admissible testimony, combined with the strong circumstantial evidence that Taylor subsequently leased the disputed property from the grantor—an unusual act if he already owned it—was sufficient to establish the plaintiffs' prima facie case. The trial court's finding to the contrary and its dismissal of the case at the close of the plaintiffs' evidence was, therefore, clearly erroneous.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the evidentiary principle of waiver, specifically in the context of a 'Dead Man's Statute,' which typically bars testimony about transactions with a deceased person. It clarifies that a party cannot use such a rule as both a shield on direct examination and a sword on cross-examination. The ruling also highlights the standard for granting a motion to dismiss in a non-jury trial, emphasizing that dismissal is improper if the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case sufficient to support their claim, even if some conflicting evidence exists. The court's focus on the parties' subsequent conduct (the lease) provides a key lesson in how to prove property boundaries when a deed is ambiguous.
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