Stupak v. Winter Park Leasing, Inc.
1991 Fla. LEXIS 1519, 585 So.2d 283, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 600 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
Under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, a vehicle owner is not relieved of liability for its misuse unless the operator's control constitutes a breach of custody amounting to a species of conversion or theft. Whether a late return of a rental vehicle constitutes such a theft is a question of fact, not a matter of law determined solely by a contractual provision labeling it as such.
Facts:
- Winter Park Leasing, Inc. (Winter Park) leased a car to Major Rent-A-Car under a master lease agreement.
- Major Rent-A-Car then rented this vehicle to David Flory.
- The rental agreement between Flory and Major Rent-A-Car specified that the vehicle was to be returned by the afternoon of November 1, 1987.
- A clause in the agreement stated that vehicles not returned by the due date are considered 'theft by conversion.'
- Another clause in the agreement implied that the rental company would not treat a late return as a theft for at least 24 hours, detailing expenses the renter would incur if the company had to locate the vehicle after that period.
- Jeffrey Stupak was a passenger in the car being driven by Flory.
- At approximately 2:00 a.m. on November 2, 1987, a few hours after the rental period expired, Flory was involved in a car accident that injured Stupak.
Procedural Posture:
- Jeffrey Stupak sued David Flory, Major Rent-A-Car, and Winter Park Leasing, Inc. in a Florida trial court.
- The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant Winter Park Leasing, Inc.
- Stupak, as appellant, appealed to the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal.
- The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision in a per curiam opinion.
- Stupak, as petitioner, sought review from the Supreme Court of Florida, which granted jurisdiction to resolve a conflict with another case.
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Issue:
Does a driver's use of a rental car a few hours past the return deadline, in contravention of a rental agreement term labeling such use as 'theft by conversion,' constitute a theft or conversion as a matter of law sufficient to relieve the vehicle's owner of liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine?
Opinions:
Majority - Grimes, J.
No. A driver's use of a rental car a few hours past the return deadline, even where a contract labels such use as 'theft by conversion,' does not constitute a theft as a matter of law sufficient to relieve the vehicle's owner of liability. First, the Court reaffirmed its recent holding in Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., establishing that long-term lessors like Winter Park Leasing can be held liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Second, addressing the argument that the driver's late return constituted a liability-severing theft, the Court applied the standard from Susco Car Rental System v. Leonard, which states that 'only a breach of custody amounting to a species of conversion or theft will relieve an owner of responsibility.' The Court found that whether Flory's actions met this standard was a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment. The evidence was conflicting: while one contract clause defined a late return as theft, another implied a 24-hour grace period. Because Winter Park Leasing, as the party moving for summary judgment, failed to prove that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding a theft or conversion, the lower court's judgment was improper.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies two key aspects of Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. It reinforces the principle from Kraemer that long-term lessors cannot escape liability simply because they are not the direct, day-to-day operators of the vehicle. More significantly, the case establishes that contractual language alone cannot define a 'theft' for the purpose of severing an owner's vicarious liability. By classifying the question of theft or conversion as a fact-intensive inquiry for a jury, the Court prevents owners and rental companies from using boilerplate contract terms to unilaterally absolve themselves of responsibility, thereby upholding the doctrine's public policy goal of ensuring recourse for those injured by dangerous instrumentalities.
