Stuart McKeever v. William Barr
920 F.3d 842 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
A federal district court's authority to order the disclosure of grand jury materials is strictly limited to the exceptions explicitly enumerated in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). Courts do not possess inherent or common-law authority to create new exceptions for reasons such as historical significance.
Facts:
- In 1956, Columbia University Professor Jesús de Galíndez Suárez disappeared from New York City, and was believed to have been murdered by agents of Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo.
- Historian Stuart A. McKeever has been researching the Galíndez disappearance since 1980.
- McKeever believed John Joseph Frank, a former FBI agent who later worked for Trujillo, was involved in the disappearance.
- In 1957, a federal grand jury investigated Frank.
- The grand jury indicted Frank for failing to register as a foreign agent, but not for any role in Galíndez's murder.
- McKeever sought the release of the records from the 1957 grand jury investigation of Frank to aid in the writing of his book.
Procedural Posture:
- Stuart A. McKeever petitioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for the release of grand jury records.
- The district court asserted that it possessed inherent authority to disclose historically significant grand jury matters.
- Despite asserting this authority, the district court denied McKeever's petition, ruling that the request was overbroad.
- McKeever, the petitioner, appealed the district court's denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a federal district court possess inherent authority to authorize the disclosure of grand jury materials for reasons of historical significance, beyond the exceptions explicitly enumerated in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)?
Opinions:
Majority - Ginsburg, Senior Circuit Judge
No. A federal district court lacks inherent authority to disclose grand jury materials and is strictly confined to the exceptions enumerated in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). The text of Rule 6(e)(2)(B) establishes a general rule of secrecy 'Unless these rules provide otherwise,' and Rule 6(e)(3) provides the exclusive list of exceptions. The specific and detailed nature of these exceptions, without a residual clause, indicates that the drafters did not intend for courts to create additional exceptions. Allowing courts to craft new exceptions for policy reasons, such as historical significance, would render the detailed list in the Rule superfluous and would impermissibly circumvent a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, as established in precedents like Carlisle v. United States. While grand jury secrecy concerns may diminish over time, the ex ante promise of confidentiality is critical to encourage candid witness testimony, and creating ad hoc exceptions would undermine that promise.
Dissenting - Srinivasan, Circuit Judge
Yes. A district court retains inherent discretion to release grand jury materials in circumstances beyond those expressly identified in Rule 6(e). This court's en banc decision in Haldeman v. Sirica, which approved the release of Watergate grand jury materials to the House Judiciary Committee, serves as binding precedent for allowing disclosures outside the strict confines of Rule 6(e)'s text. The court in Haldeman endorsed the district court's reasoning, which relied on its inherent authority and cited cases that permitted disclosures 'wholly apart from judicial proceedings.' Therefore, the majority's conclusion that Rule 6(e) is exhaustive contradicts controlling circuit precedent, which recognized a court's authority to weigh the public interest in disclosure against any remaining need for secrecy.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a deep circuit split regarding the scope of judicial authority over grand jury records. By adopting a strict textualist interpretation of Rule 6(e), the D.C. Circuit aligns with the Sixth and Eighth Circuits and rejects the more flexible approach of the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, which recognize inherent authority to disclose materials in 'special circumstances' like historical significance. The ruling establishes a bright-line rule within the D.C. Circuit, significantly limiting access for historians, journalists, and the public to records of major historical investigations. This increases the pressure for a legislative amendment to Rule 6(e) or a Supreme Court resolution to create a uniform national standard.
