Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen
62 L. Ed. 2d 433, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 20, 100 S.Ct 497 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is an essentially procedural statute that requires an agency to consider the environmental consequences of its actions, but does not mandate that environmental concerns be elevated over other legitimate considerations, such as project delays. A reviewing court's role is limited to ensuring the agency has complied with these procedural requirements, not to substitute its own judgment on the substantive merits of the agency's decision.
Facts:
- In 1962, the New York City Planning Commission (Commission) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) initiated the West Side Urban Renewal Area (WSURA) plan.
- The original plan called for a mix of 70% middle-income and 30% low-income housing, designating a particular site for a middle-income project.
- By 1969, local New York agencies determined that the need for low-income housing in the area had significantly increased.
- In response, the Commission amended the WSURA plan to redesignate the site for a 160-unit low-income housing project.
- HUD officially approved this amendment in December 1972.
- The Trinity Episcopal School Corp. had previously participated in the WSURA plan by constructing a school and middle-income housing development on a nearby site.
Procedural Posture:
- Trinity Episcopal School Corp. sued HUD in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to enjoin construction of a low-income housing project.
- Roland N. Karlen and others (respondents) intervened as plaintiffs; Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council (petitioner) intervened as a defendant.
- The District Court entered judgment for the defendants, finding no NEPA violation.
- The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Second Circuit affirmed in part but held that HUD failed to adequately consider alternatives as required by NEPA, and remanded the case for HUD to prepare a statement of alternatives.
- On remand, HUD prepared a report evaluating alternatives but concluded that relocation would cause unacceptable delays.
- The District Court again entered judgment for the defendants, finding HUD's consideration of alternatives was not arbitrary or capricious.
- The plaintiffs appealed again to the Second Circuit.
- The Second Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that delay could not be an 'overriding factor' and that environmental factors 'should be given determinative weight,' and remanded the case again.
- Strycker's Bay and HUD filed petitions for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), may a reviewing court overturn an agency's decision on substantive grounds and require the agency to give environmental factors determinative weight, once it has been established that the agency properly considered the environmental consequences of its action?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. Once an agency has complied with the procedural requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by considering the environmental consequences of a proposed action, a reviewing court cannot reweigh the factors considered by the agency or compel it to elevate environmental concerns over other legitimate considerations. Relying on Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, the Court affirmed that NEPA imposes 'essentially procedural' duties on agencies. Its purpose is to ensure a 'fully informed and well-considered decision,' not to guarantee a specific substantive outcome that a court might prefer. The Court of Appeals erred by interjecting itself into the agency's discretionary decision-making process and requiring HUD to give 'determinative weight' to environmental factors over the significant project delays that would result from choosing an alternative site. Since HUD undoubtedly considered the environmental consequences, NEPA requires no more.
Dissenting - Marshall, J.
The majority oversimplifies the scope of judicial review under NEPA and misapplies the precedent of Vermont Yankee. Review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is not a 'mindless task' limited to confirming an agency merely 'considered' environmental factors. Courts must conduct a 'searching and careful' inquiry to ensure an agency's decision is not arbitrary or capricious, which includes assessing whether the agency took a 'hard look' at environmental consequences. In this case, HUD's own report acknowledged that an alternative site was environmentally superior, yet rejected it solely due to a projected two-year delay. Whether this trade-off is arbitrary or capricious is a substantial legal question that the Court of Appeals properly addressed and is worthy of plenary review, not summary reversal. The Court's decision effectively allows an agency to acknowledge but then ignore significant environmental factors.
Analysis:
This per curiam opinion, along with Vermont Yankee, firmly established NEPA as a procedural, rather than substantive, statute. The ruling significantly limits the power of federal courts to review the merits of an agency's decision, reinforcing agency discretion. As long as an agency follows the prescribed procedural steps of studying and considering environmental impacts, it is free to balance those impacts against other priorities like cost, efficiency, or project timelines. This decision makes it substantially more difficult for litigants to challenge federal projects on the grounds that the agency made the wrong substantive choice, shifting the focus of NEPA litigation almost entirely to procedural compliance.
