No. A promise to wait 'until I want my money' is not a real, binding promise. The creditor could have decided he wanted his money one minute after the wife signed the note and sued immediately. Since his promise didn't actually restrict him from doing anything, it was an empty or 'illusory' promise. Because the creditor gave nothing of real value, the wife's promise to pay is not enforceable. It doesn't matter that he happened to wait two years; what matters is that he wasn't legally required to.

No, the plaintiff's agreement to wait until he felt like collecting the debt is not good enough consideration for the defendant's promise to pay. For it to be enforceable, the plaintiff would have needed to agree to wait a specific amount of time, or at least a reasonable amount of time. Because the plaintiff could have asked for the money back right away without breaking his promise, his promise didn't really bind him to do anything. So there was no real consideration, even though he did end up waiting a while. The trial court made a mistake by not recognizing this. The higher court's decision that the defendant doesn't have to pay is affirmed, and the defendant should get paid back for the costs of the court case.

No. We hold that the plaintiff's agreement to wait until he felt like collecting the debt is not good enough consideration for the defendant's promise to pay. For it to be enforceable, the plaintiff needed to agree to wait for a specific amount of time, or at least a reasonable amount of time. Because the plaintiff could have asked for the money back right away without breaking his promise, the promise did not really force him to do anything. So there was no real consideration, even though he did end up waiting. We find that the trial court made a mistake by not recognizing this. We affirm the higher court's decision that the defendant does not have to pay, and the defendant should get back the costs of the court case.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <opinion type="majority"> <author id="b420-6"> Andrews, Oh. J. </author> The contract between a maker or indorser of a promissory note and the payee forms no exception to the general rule that a promise, not supported by a consideration, is nudxvm paobum. The law governing commercial paper which precludes an inquiry into the consideration as against tona fide holders for value before maturity, has no application where the suit is between the original parties to the instrument. It is undisputed that the demand note upon which the action was brought was made by the husband of the defendant and indorsed by her at his request and delivered to the plaintiff, the payee, as security for an antecedent debt owing by the husband to the plaintiff. The debt of the husband was past due at the time, and the only consideration for the wife’s indorsement, which is or can be claimed, is that as part of the transaction there was an agreement by the plaintiff when the note was given to forbear the collection of the debt, or a request for forbearance, which was followed by forbearance for a period of about two years subsequent to the giving of the note. There is no doubt that an agreement by the creditor to forbear the collection of a debt presently due is a good consideration for an absolute or conditional promise of a third person to pay the debt, or for any obligation he may assume in respect thereto. Hor is it essential -that the creditor should bind himself at the time to forbear collection or to give time. If he is requested by his debtor to extend the time, and a third person undertakes in consideration of forbearance being given to become liable as surety or otherwise, and the creditor does in fact forbear in reliance upon the undertaking, although he enters into no enforcible agreement to do so, his acquiescence in the request, and an actual forbearance in consequence thereof for a reasonable time, furnishes a good consideration for the col *395 lateral undertaking. In other words, a request, followed by performance is sufficient, and mutual promises at the time are not essential, unless it was the understanding that the promisor was not to be bound, except on condition that the other party entered into an immediate and reciprocal obligation to do the thing requested. (Morton v. Burn, 7 A. &amp; E. 19; Wilby v. Elgee, L. R., 10 C. P. 497; King v. Upton, 4 Maine, 387; Leake on Con. p. 54; Am. Lead. Cas. vol. 2, p. 96 et seq. and cases cited.) The general rule is clearly, and. in the main accurately, stated in the note to Forth v. Stanton (1 Saund. 210, note b). The learned reporter says: “ And in all cases of forbearance to sue, such forbearance must be either absolute or for a definite time, or for a reasonable time ; forbearance for a little, or for some time, is not sufficient.” The only qualification to be made is that in the absence of a specified time a reasonable time is held to be intended. (Oldershaw v. King, 2 H. &amp; N. 517; Calkins v. Chandler, 36 Mich. 320.) The. note in question did not in law extend the payment of the debt. It was payable on demand, and although being payable with interest it was in form consistent with an intention that payment should not be immediately demanded, yet there was nothing on its face to prevent an immediate suit on the note against the maker or to recover the original debt. (Merritt v. Todd, 23 N. Y. 28; Shutts v. Fingar, 100 id. 539.) In the present case the agreement made is not left to inference, nor was it a case of request to forbear, followed by forbearance, in pursuance of the request, without any promise on the part of the creditor at the time. The plaintiff testified that there was an express agreement on his part to the effect that he would not pay the note away, nor put it in any bank for collection, but (using the words of the plaintiff) “ I will hold it until such time as I want my money, I will make a demand on you for it.” And again: “No, I will keep it until such time as I want it.” Upon this alleged agreement the defendant indorsed the note. It would have been no violation of the plaintiff’s promise if, immediately on receiving *396 the note, he had commenced suit upon it. Such a suit would have been an assertion that he wanted the money and would have fulfilled the condition of forbearance. The debtor and the defendant, when they became parties to the note, may have had the hope or expectation that forbearance would follow, and there was forbearance in fact. But there was no agreement to forbear for a fixed time or for a reasonable time, but an agreement to forbear for such time as the plaintrS should elect. The consideration is to be tested by the agreement, and not by what was done under it. It was a case of mutual promises, and so intended. We think the evidence failed to disclose any consideration for the defendant’s indorsement, and that the trial court erred in refusing so to rule. The order of the General Term reversing the judgment should be affirmed, and judgment absolute directed for the defendant on the stipulation, with costs in all courts. All concur, except Gray and Bartlett, JJ., not votings and Haight, J., not sitting. Ordered accordingly. </opinion>

No. A creditor's promise to forbear collecting on a debt for an indefinite period determinable solely by his own will does not constitute sufficient consideration. While an agreement to forbear the collection of a debt for a definite or reasonable time is valid consideration, the agreement here was not of that character. The plaintiff's promise to hold the note until he wanted his money meant he could have demanded payment and sued on the note immediately without violating the agreement. Such a suit would be the plaintiff's way of showing he 'wanted his money.' Because the plaintiff's promise was illusory and did not bind him to forbear for any period, it was not valid consideration. The enforceability of the agreement must be tested by the promises made at the time of formation, not by the subsequent fact that the plaintiff did actually forbear for two years.

No. We hold that the agreement to forbear collection until such time as the plaintiff wanted, without specifying a fixed or reasonable time, is not valid consideration for the defendant's indorsement. A promise to forbear must be for a definite time or at least a reasonable time. Because the plaintiff could have demanded payment immediately without violating that promise, there was no mutuality of obligation and therefore no valid consideration, despite the actual forbearance. The evidence failed to disclose any consideration for the defendant's indorsement. We conclude that the trial court erred in not ruling as such. Therefore, we affirm the order of the General Term reversing the judgment, and direct judgment absolute for the defendant with costs in all courts.

Strong v. Sheffield

Case Podcast

Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

Gunnerbot