Strong v. Garrett
1949 Tex. LEXIS 458, 224 S. W.2d 471, 148 Tex. 265 (1949)
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Rule of Law:
When an adverse possession claim begins with an equitable property right (such as a right to deed reformation) prior to marriage, the property, when fully acquired by limitation during marriage, becomes separate property, not community property. Additionally, a general description in a deed will prevail over a specific metes and bounds description if the two are wholly repugnant and the grantor's true intention to convey the land covered by the general description is clear.
Facts:
- Mrs. M. B. James owned Tract No. 3.
- In December 1902, Mrs. James sold 62.5 acres to Anderson Strong, but the deed mistakenly described Tract No. 2, not Tract No. 3, and retained a vendor's lien.
- Anderson Strong began living on and cultivating Tract No. 3 as his homestead as early as 1905, and continued doing so until his death in 1916.
- In 1912, Anderson Strong married Ida Young, his second wife.
- Anderson Strong died intestate in March 1916, survived by Ida Young Strong and his children from his first marriage, Jesse Joseph Strong and Alma B. Strong (the plaintiffs).
- A probate court order set aside the homestead (Tract No. 3) to his widow, Ida Young Strong.
- Before marrying Charlie Garrett, Ida Young Strong conveyed land to him by warranty deed which, like the original deed, used the metes and bounds description for Tract No. 2, but also included a general description referring to the homestead set aside to her by the probate court and purchased by Anderson Strong.
- Ida Young Strong Garrett died intestate in 1936.
Procedural Posture:
- Jesse Joseph Strong and Alma B. Strong (plaintiffs), along with Leuvinia Lewis and Cleveland Lewis (defendants), initiated an action in trespass to try title in the Rusk County trial court against Charlie Garrett and others.
- The trial court awarded title to Charlie Garrett on his cross-action.
- Jesse Joseph Strong, Alma B. Strong, and Leuvinia Lewis and husband, Cleveland Lewis, appealed the trial court's judgment.
- The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- The Strongs and the Lewises petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review.
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Issue:
Does property acquired by adverse possession, where the claimant initiated their possession based on an equitable right to deed reformation prior to marriage but completed the statutory limitation period during marriage, constitute separate property or community property?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Hickman
Yes, property acquired by adverse possession, where the claimant began with an equitable right before marriage, becomes separate property, even if the limitation period completes during marriage. The Court reasoned that Anderson Strong was not a "naked trespasser" but had an existing equitable property right (the right to reform the mistakenly described deed) prior to his marriage to Ida Young Strong. Therefore, when his title ripened by limitation, it "took character from his original claim," establishing it as his separate estate. The Court distinguished this from cases where property acquired by pure limitation (beginning as a trespasser) during marriage is community property. The Court further held that in the deed from Ida Young Strong to Charlie Garrett, the general description of the land (the homestead set aside by the probate court) prevailed over the specific metes and bounds description (Tract No. 2). The Court explained that while a specific description usually controls, this rule does not apply when the general description is wholly repugnant to the specific, and the grantor's true intention to convey the land covered by the general description "clearly and unmistakably appears from the language of the entire instrument." Ida Young Strong clearly intended to convey her actual homestead (Tract No. 3), not Tract No. 2, to which she had no title. However, the Court noted that Ida Young Strong only owned a life estate in one-third of the land, not the fee title she purported to convey. Thus, Charlie Garrett received only that life estate interest, which terminated upon Ida’s death in 1936. Limitation could not begin to run against the remaindermen (the plaintiffs) for that one-third interest until Ida's death. As to the remaining two-thirds, Charlie Garrett was treated as a trespasser, and any title he acquired through adverse possession would be community property of either his first or second marriage, depending on when the limitation period was completed. The payment of a vendor's lien note on Tract No. 2 did not vest title to Tract No. 3 in Garrett, only potentially created an equitable lien. The Court also addressed that the plaintiffs' minority, though not pleaded, was raised by unobjected evidence and should be considered on remand. The judgments of the lower courts were reversed, and the case remanded.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the classification of property acquired through adverse possession under Texas community property law, particularly distinguishing between claims initiated with an equitable right and those by a "naked trespasser." It provides a crucial exception to the general rule of deed interpretation, emphasizing grantor intent over conflicting specific descriptions when that intent is unambiguous. The ruling also underscores the importance of proper pleading, even when evidence is admitted without objection, though courts may treat the issue as if pleaded under certain procedural rules.
