Strickland v. Washington
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient (fell below an objective standard of reasonableness) and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense (there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different).
Facts:
- During a 10-day period in September 1976, David Washington committed three brutal stabbing murders along with torture, kidnappings, and other violent felonies.
- After his accomplices were caught, Washington surrendered and confessed to the third murder.
- Against the specific advice of his appointed counsel, Washington later confessed to the first two murders as well.
- Acting against his counsel's advice again, Washington waived his right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty to all charges, including three counts of capital murder.
- Washington also rejected his counsel's advice to have an advisory jury for his sentencing hearing, choosing to be sentenced by the judge alone.
- In preparing for sentencing, counsel's investigation into mitigating evidence was limited; he spoke to Washington's wife and mother by phone once but did not follow up, did not seek other character witnesses, and did not request a psychiatric evaluation.
- Counsel made a strategic decision to not present mitigating character or psychological evidence to prevent the State from cross-examining Washington and introducing its own damaging psychiatric evidence or Washington's criminal history.
- Counsel's sentencing argument relied on Washington's remorse, acceptance of responsibility expressed during the plea colloquy, and the statutory mitigating circumstances of emotional distress and lack of a significant criminal history.
Procedural Posture:
- David Washington pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death in a Florida state trial court.
- The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal.
- Washington filed a petition for collateral relief in the state trial court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, which the court denied without an evidentiary hearing.
- The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of collateral relief.
- Washington filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
- The District Court held an evidentiary hearing but ultimately denied the petition, finding no prejudice.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, hearing the case en banc, reversed the District Court, establishing its own new standard for ineffective assistance claims and remanding for new factfinding under that standard.
- The State of Florida (represented by Strickland, the prison superintendent) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
What is the proper legal standard for a criminal defendant to establish that their conviction or death sentence should be overturned on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O'Connor
The proper standard requires a defendant to prove two components. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that 1) counsel's performance was deficient, meaning it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and 2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, meaning there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and strategic choices made after a reasonable investigation are virtually unchallengeable. Applying this standard, counsel's decision to rely on the plea colloquy and not introduce new mitigating evidence was a reasonable strategic choice to prevent the prosecution from introducing damaging rebuttal evidence. Furthermore, even if the performance was deficient, Washington failed to show prejudice; given the overwhelming aggravating circumstances, there is no reasonable probability that the omitted character and psychological evidence would have changed the sentencing outcome.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
This standard is incorrect. The majority's "objective standard of reasonableness" for performance is so malleable that it provides no real guidance and will be applied inconsistently. More fundamentally, the prejudice requirement is wrong; the purpose of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is to ensure a fundamentally fair procedure, not just to reduce the chance of an incorrect outcome. A showing that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient should be sufficient to require a new trial or sentencing, regardless of whether the defendant can demonstrate a high probability that the outcome would have changed. The right to effective counsel is so basic to a fair trial that its denial should be treated as a structural error that is never harmless.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Brennan
The standard articulated by the Court is correct, but the judgment should be reversed. While joining the Court's opinion establishing the two-part test for ineffectiveness, he dissented from the judgment, adhering to his view that the death penalty is, in all circumstances, cruel and unusual punishment. He emphasized that the standards announced by the Court must be applied with special care in capital sentencing proceedings due to the severity and finality of the death penalty. Counsel's duty to investigate mitigating evidence takes on supreme importance in this context, and claims of ineffective assistance related to that duty should be considered with commensurate care.
Analysis:
This landmark decision established the definitive two-part test for all ineffective assistance of counsel claims, resolving a deep division among lower federal and state courts. The Strickland test creates a high bar for defendants, as it requires not only proving that an attorney's performance was objectively unreasonable but also demonstrating a concrete, prejudicial effect on the outcome. The Court's emphasis on a "strong presumption" of competence and its deference to "strategic decisions" makes it exceedingly difficult to win such claims, significantly shaping criminal appeals and post-conviction relief litigation by favoring finality over second-guessing counsel's performance.
