Strauss v. Cilek
418 N.W.2d 378 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
A secret, consensual extramarital affair, even with the spouse of a close friend, does not by itself constitute 'outrageous conduct' sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Facts:
- The plaintiff and defendant had known each other since elementary school and were good friends.
- The defendant engaged in a secret romantic and sexual affair with the plaintiff's wife that lasted for one year.
- The affair was kept secret, and the plaintiff did not learn about it until after it had ended.
- The plaintiff's wife was unhappy in her marriage and had previously been involved in a five-year extramarital affair with another of the plaintiff's good friends.
- Personal letters written by the defendant indicated a genuine intention to create a permanent relationship with the plaintiff's wife.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff sued defendant in a state trial court, asserting a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and seeking actual and punitive damages.
- Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the court to dismiss the case.
- The trial court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
- Defendant, as appellant, was granted an interlocutory appeal to the intermediate appellate court to review the trial court's denial of his motion.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's conduct in engaging in a secret, year-long romantic and sexual affair with the plaintiff's wife constitute outrageous conduct sufficient to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, even when the plaintiff and defendant were good friends?
Opinions:
Majority - Sackett, Judge
No. A defendant's conduct in engaging in a secret, year-long affair with the plaintiff's wife, who was a willing participant, does not rise to the level of outrageous conduct required for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court determined that to be 'outrageous,' conduct must be 'so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' Citing precedents like Roalson v. Chaney and Kunau v. Pillers, the court reasoned that marital infidelity, while not condoned, does not typically meet this exceptionally high standard. The fact that the parties were friends was not a sufficient aggravating factor, especially given that the affair was kept secret and the plaintiff's wife had a history of infidelity. The court concluded that an average member of the community would not exclaim 'Outrageous!' upon hearing the facts of this case.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high threshold required to establish the 'outrageous conduct' element of an intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim in the context of marital infidelity. It demonstrates the judiciary's reluctance to use tort law to regulate private, consensual relationships, effectively preventing IIED from becoming a substitute for abolished 'heart balm' torts like alienation of affections. By setting such a high bar, the court signals that only conduct with significant aggravating factors beyond the affair itself—such as public humiliation, threats, or exploitation of a special relationship of trust (e.g., a therapist)—is likely to be considered legally outrageous. This case serves as a strong precedent against IIED claims based solely on adultery, even when a friendship is betrayed.
