Straub v. B.M.T. Ex Rel. Todd
645 N.E.2d 597, 1994 Ind. LEXIS 219, 1994 WL 725524 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
A pre-conception agreement purporting to terminate a biological parent's duty to support their child is void and unenforceable as it contravenes the public policy of protecting the welfare and financial security of children.
Facts:
- In 1986, Francine Todd and Edward Straub were in a romantic relationship.
- Todd expressed a desire to have a child without being married, while Straub, a divorced father of five, was resistant.
- Todd threatened to end the relationship unless Straub agreed to impregnate her.
- On December 15, 1986, Straub drafted an agreement stating Todd wanted a child of her own, would be solely responsible for the child financially and emotionally, and that the father would not be held responsible.
- Todd signed the agreement.
- Thereafter, the couple engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse, and Todd became pregnant in March 1987.
- Todd gave birth to B.M.T. in November 1987; the birth certificate did not name a father.
Procedural Posture:
- Francine Todd filed a petition in the trial court to establish Edward Straub's paternity and for an order of child support.
- The trial court found Straub to be the father and ordered him to pay child support, arrearages, and certain medical expenses.
- Straub, as appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Indiana Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
- Straub, as petitioner, then petitioned the Supreme Court of Indiana to accept the case for transfer.
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Issue:
Does a pre-conception agreement in which a biological father is released from any future child support obligation violate public policy and is therefore void?
Opinions:
Majority - Shepard, C.J.
Yes, a pre-conception agreement releasing a biological father from child support obligations violates public policy and is void. The right to child support belongs exclusively to the child and cannot be contracted away by a parent, as doing so is directly contrary to Indiana's well-established public policy of protecting the welfare of children. The court rejected Straub's argument that this was 'artificial insemination by intercourse,' finding it was a traditional attempt to forego a child's right to support from both parents. Furthermore, the court noted that using sexual intercourse as consideration for an agreement is itself against public policy, providing an independent basis for voiding the contract. The agreement also lacked the formalities and protections, such as physician involvement, that legislatures and courts in other jurisdictions deem necessary for assisted conception arrangements.
Dissenting - DeBruler, J.
No, the contract should not be voided in its entirety. While one cannot contract away a child's right to support, the agreement should be interpreted as a promise by Todd to cover Straub's financial obligation. Analogizing to liability insurance, which does not eliminate liability for negligence but provides a source of payment, this agreement does not eliminate the child's right to support but contractually shifts the source of that support to Todd. The proper remedy would be to enforce the agreement against Todd, requiring her to pay Straub's share of the support if she is financially able, thereby ensuring the child is supported while holding the parties to their bargain.
Analysis:
This decision firmly establishes that the right to child support is an inalienable right of the child, not a negotiable right of the parents. By invalidating a private, pre-conception contract, the court affirmed the state's paramount interest in ensuring children are financially supported by both biological parents. The ruling curtails the ability of individuals to creatively contract around fundamental parental obligations and clarifies that informal arrangements will not be treated as legally sophisticated assisted reproduction agreements, which are typically governed by specific statutes and formalities.
