Stones River Motors, Inc. v. Mid-South Publishing Co.
651 S.W.2d 713, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 702 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
A statement of opinion based on disclosed, non-defamatory facts is not actionable as libel, even if the opinion is expressed in strong, vituperative, or hyperbolic terms such as 'rip-off' or 'highway robbery.' Such characterizations are constitutionally protected under the First Amendment as they do not imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts.
Facts:
- Bill Bickford purchased a 1972 Datsun from Stones River Motors for his daughter, Christie Bickford.
- The car experienced mechanical problems two days later, and Bickford and the dealership's president, Kenneth Snell, agreed to split the repair costs.
- Four days after the repair, the car's engine failed completely when it 'threw a rod.'
- Bickford traded the broken Datsun for a 1969 Datsun from the same dealership, paying an additional $110.
- The second car also developed mechanical problems soon after the trade.
- Stones River Motors refused Bickford's request to repair the second car free of charge.
- In response, Bill Bickford wrote a letter detailing these transactions, characterizing them as a 'rip-off' and 'highway robbery,' and delivered it to two local newspapers.
- Bill Bickford signed his own name as well as the names of his wife, Mary Jo, and daughter, Christie, without their knowledge or consent.
Procedural Posture:
- Stones River Motors, Inc. and Kenneth W. Snell (plaintiffs) filed a libel suit in trial court against Bill Bickford, his wife and daughter, the Daily News Journal, and The Press (defendants).
- After discovery, all defendants filed motions for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint.
- The plaintiffs, Stones River Motors and Kenneth Snell, appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a published letter to the editor that uses hyperbolic terms like 'rip-off' and 'highway robbery' to characterize a series of fully disclosed, factually accurate business transactions constitute actionable libel?
Opinions:
Majority - Conner, J.
No, a published letter characterizing disclosed, factually accurate business transactions with hyperbolic terms is not actionable libel. For a statement of opinion to be defamatory, it must imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts. Here, the letter described the underlying transactions in detail, allowing readers to form their own judgment. Terms like 'rip-off' and 'highway robbery' were not assertions of criminal conduct but were understood as 'rhetorical hyperbole' and 'vigorous epithets' expressing the writer's dissatisfaction. Citing Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566, the court held that as long as the true, non-defamatory facts on which an opinion is based are published, the opinion itself is constitutionally protected. The court distinguished this from Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, where defamation arose from omitting material facts, which did not happen here.
Concurring - Todd, P.J.
No, the claim against The Press fails, but for a more limited reason. The concurrence agrees with the outcome but expresses concern that a newspaper should not automatically be granted summary judgment when it prints a non-libelous letter under a potentially libelous headline. The author concurs in the result only because the plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence that the publication was, in fact, capable of being understood in a defamatory sense.
Analysis:
This case establishes the constitutional protection for statements of pure opinion in Tennessee libel law, formally adopting the framework of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566. The decision solidifies the distinction between factual assertions, which can be libelous if false, and subjective characterizations based on disclosed facts, which are protected. By classifying terms like 'rip-off' as non-actionable hyperbole, the ruling provides significant breathing room for consumer complaints and public criticism. This precedent makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to sue for libel based on negative reviews or commentary, so long as the underlying factual basis for the opinion is accurately stated.
