Stone v. Peacock
968 F.2d 1163, 1992 WL 180273 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
The determination of whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity is a question of law for the court to decide, not a question of fact for the jury. If a trial court erroneously submits this issue to the jury, reversal is required unless it is clear the jury's verdict rested solely on the merits of the underlying claim.
Facts:
- Calvin J. Stone was an employee of the Georgia Department of Corrections.
- James E. Peacock was Stone's supervisor, L.C. Strange was Peacock's supervisor, and Vince Fallin was a deputy commissioner.
- Stone spoke out about what he believed to be the improper use of public property and funds within the department.
- Following Stone's complaints, Peacock issued him a reprimand and a failing performance report.
- The Georgia Department of Corrections subsequently terminated Stone's employment.
- The defendants contended that Stone was discharged for misappropriation of state funds, not for his speech.
Procedural Posture:
- Calvin J. Stone sued his supervisors, James E. Peacock, L.C. Strange, and Vince Fallin, in federal district court, alleging retaliatory termination.
- Defendants Strange and Fallin moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the trial court denied.
- During trial, at the close of the plaintiff's case, the court granted a directed verdict in favor of defendant Peacock.
- The case against Strange and Fallin proceeded, and the court instructed the jury on both the merits of the claim and the defense of qualified immunity.
- The jury returned general verdicts in favor of defendants Strange and Fallin.
- Stone (appellant) appealed the jury verdicts and the directed verdict to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by instructing the jury on the defense of qualified immunity and allowing the jury to decide whether the defendants are entitled to it?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes, a trial court commits reversible error by instructing the jury on the defense of qualified immunity. The court held that the availability of a qualified immunity defense is a question of law for the court, not the jury, to determine. Citing its recent decision in Ansley v. Heinrich, the court clarified that this legal determination must be made by the judge, whether before, during, or after trial. While such an error is not always reversible, in this case the trial court used a general verdict form, making it impossible to know the basis for the jury's decision. The jury might have found that the defendants violated Stone's rights but were nevertheless entitled to immunity, a conclusion it was not permitted to make. Because the improper instruction could have caused the defeat of an otherwise meritorious claim, the verdicts must be vacated and the case remanded for the district court to properly decide the immunity issue itself.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the principle in the 11th Circuit that judges are the sole gatekeepers of the qualified immunity defense. It clarifies that the defense is an immunity from suit, not merely a defense to liability, and therefore its resolution should not be left to the jury, which decides factual disputes on the merits. This decision emphasizes the procedural importance of separating the legal question of immunity from the factual questions of the underlying constitutional claim. The ruling protects plaintiffs from losing meritorious claims on improperly applied legal grounds by a jury and reinforces the judiciary's role in resolving pure questions of law.
