Stoddard v. State
389 Md. 681, 887 A.2d 564, 2005 Md. LEXIS 731 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
An out-of-court utterance constitutes inadmissible hearsay when it is offered to prove the truth of a factual proposition that it unintentionally implies. In Maryland, a declarant's lack of intent to communicate an implied belief is irrelevant to whether the utterance is an assertion for hearsay purposes.
Facts:
- On June 15, 2002, three-year-old Calen DiRubbo died from multiple blunt force injuries, including a severed bowel.
- The medical examiner determined the fatal injury occurred during a time frame when Erik Stoddard was, for at least some of that period, the only adult supervising Calen.
- Also present under Stoddard's supervision was Calen's eighteen-month-old cousin, Jasmine Pritchett.
- Sometime after Calen's death, Jasmine's mother, Jennifer Pritchett, noticed significant behavioral changes in Jasmine, including nightmares and becoming petrified of loud noises.
- Jennifer Pritchett had not discussed the events of Calen's death with Jasmine.
- Jasmine subsequently asked her mother, Jennifer Pritchett, the question, "is Erik going to get me?"
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Maryland prosecuted Erik Stoddard in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a state trial court.
- During the jury trial, the court overruled a defense hearsay objection and admitted testimony from Jennifer Pritchett about her daughter Jasmine's question, 'is Erik going to get me?'
- The jury convicted Stoddard of second degree murder and child abuse resulting in death.
- Stoddard, as appellant, appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, the state's intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the child's question was a 'non-assertive verbal utterance' and not hearsay.
- The Court of Appeals of Maryland, the state's highest court, granted Stoddard's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.
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Issue:
Does an out-of-court question from a non-testifying child, offered to prove the truth of a factual proposition the child unintentionally implied, constitute inadmissible hearsay under Maryland Rule 5-801?
Opinions:
Majority - Raker, J.
Yes. An out-of-court utterance offered to prove the truth of an implied assertion is inadmissible hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant intended to make the assertion. The State offered Jasmine's question not for its literal meaning, but to prove the truth of the implied proposition that Jasmine witnessed Stoddard assault Calen. Maryland's hearsay rule, unlike the federal rule as interpreted by its Advisory Committee, retains the common law approach from Wright v. Tatham, which does not require an intent to assert. The rationale is that the four primary hearsay dangers—faulty perception, memory, narration, and insincerity—are all present in an implied assertion, and the lack of intent to communicate only mitigates the risk of insincerity, not the other three. Because the probative value of Jasmine's question depended entirely on the truth of the belief it implied, and because that belief could not be tested by cross-examination, it was inadmissible hearsay. The error was not harmless, as the prosecutor heavily relied on this statement in closing argument to portray Jasmine as an eyewitness.
Concurring - Wilner, J.
Yes. While the majority reaches the correct result, it does so by adhering to the antiquated and widely rejected implied assertion doctrine from Wright v. Tatham. The modern and correct approach, followed by the vast majority of jurisdictions, is that conduct is not a 'statement' for hearsay purposes unless the declarant intended it as an assertion. However, even under this modern rule, the testimony was inadmissible for two reasons. First, it still constituted hearsay because the question's relevance depended entirely on the jury assuming Jasmine intended to assert that she witnessed the assault, making it a statement offered for its truth. Second, and more importantly, the testimony was inadmissible because the declarant, Jasmine, was almost certainly incompetent to be a witness due to her extremely young age (18-24 months), and an out-of-court statement is inadmissible under a hearsay exception if the declarant would have been incompetent to testify in court.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Maryland's position as a minority jurisdiction that retains the common law approach to verbal implied assertions, even after adopting evidentiary rules modeled on the Federal Rules of Evidence. By rejecting the federal intent-based standard, the court affirms that out-of-court words offered to prove an implied belief are hearsay, regardless of the speaker's intent. This creates a significant doctrinal split with federal courts and the majority of states, making the scope of Maryland's hearsay rule broader and more exclusionary. Future litigants in Maryland must be aware that evidence of unintentional implications, which might be admissible elsewhere as non-hearsay circumstantial evidence, will likely be excluded in Maryland courts.
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