Stirone v. United States
361 U.S. 212, 4 L. Ed. 2d 252, 1960 U.S. LEXIS 1969 (1960)
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Rule of Law:
The Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury Clause prohibits a federal court from broadening the charges in an indictment, either through evidence or jury instructions, beyond what the grand jury originally presented, even if the new theory of guilt falls under the same statute.
Facts:
- From 1951 to 1953, William G. Rider held a contract to supply ready-mixed concrete for the erection of a steel-processing plant in Allenport, Pennsylvania.
- To fulfill his contract, Rider regularly imported sand and other materials from outside Pennsylvania into the state for his concrete mixing plant.
- Nicholas Stirone, leveraging his influential union position, unlawfully extorted $31,274.13 from Rider.
- Stirone induced the payment from Rider by instilling fear and threatening labor disputes, as well as obstructing or preventing Rider's performance of his concrete supply contract.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioner Nicholas Stirone was indicted by a grand jury and subsequently convicted in a federal trial court for unlawfully interfering with interstate commerce in violation of the Hobbs Act.
- During the trial, over Stirone's objection, the District Court permitted the government to introduce evidence and instruct the jury that Stirone's guilt could be based on interference with either (1) sand shipments into Pennsylvania or (2) future steel shipments from the plant Rider was building to other states.
- The District Court denied Stirone's motion for arrest of judgment, acquittal, or new trial, ruling that the indictment provided a sufficient foundation for both types of proof.
- Stirone appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the conviction was affirmed; all judges agreed that interference with sand movements into Pennsylvania was covered by the Hobbs Act.
- Two judges in the Court of Appeals (Judge Hastie and Chief Judge Biggs) dissented from the majority's holding, arguing that Stirone could not be tried and convicted for interference with prospective steel shipments because it was not charged in the indictment and constituted an unreasonable extension of the Act.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by allowing the government to present evidence and instructing the jury that a defendant's guilt for Hobbs Act violations could be based on an effect on interstate commerce (steel shipments) not explicitly charged in the grand jury indictment, when the indictment only alleged interference with a different type of interstate commerce (sand shipments)?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Black
Yes, a trial court commits reversible error by allowing a defendant to be tried on charges that are not made in the indictment against him. The Court acknowledged that Stirone's interference with Rider's business, which depended on out-of-state sand shipments, could properly fall under the Hobbs Act, as the Act broadly punishes interference with interstate commerce. However, the Court found a fatal error in the trial court's decision to permit the government to introduce evidence and instruct the jury that Stirone's guilt could also be based on interference with the prospective interstate shipments of steel from the plant Rider was helping to build. Citing Ex parte Bain, the Court reaffirmed the principle that an indictment's charges cannot be broadened by the court after it has been returned by a grand jury, as this infringes upon the Fifth Amendment right to be tried solely on charges presented by a grand jury. Even without a formal amendment, the trial court's actions in allowing a new theory of commerce interference (steel exports) to be considered by the jury had the same unconstitutional effect. This new basis for conviction was neither trivial nor innocuous, and the Court could not assume the grand jury would have charged interference with steel from a 'nonexistent steel mill.' The purpose of the grand jury is to limit a defendant's jeopardy to offenses charged by fellow citizens, and this protection is defeated when a defendant is subjected to prosecution for an offense not charged.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury Clause, establishing a strict boundary against judicial expansion of an indictment's scope. It clarifies that a defendant's right to be tried only on the charges the grand jury brought is a substantial constitutional protection, preventing judges and prosecutors from effectively amending an indictment by introducing new theories of guilt at trial. Stirone underscores the grand jury's vital role in safeguarding citizens against arbitrary prosecution and ensures that the specific factual basis for a federal felony conviction must be clearly articulated by the grand jury. Future cases must scrupulously adhere to the indictment's scope regarding the specific details of the alleged offense, particularly jurisdictional elements like the nature of interstate commerce affected.
