Stickdorn v. Zook
2011 Ind. App. LEXIS 1921, 957 N.E.2d 1014, 2011 WL 5904426 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
For a nuisance or trespass that is temporary, recurring, and abatable, the statute of limitations begins to run anew with each separate injury. Such actions are distinct from those involving a permanent nuisance, where the limitations period begins when the injury is first discernible.
Facts:
- Eric and Lisa Stickdorn owned and resided on a farm in Wayne County since 1994.
- In 2003, Samuel and Mattie Lantz constructed a dairy farm on property adjacent to the Stickdorns, with a milking parlor located approximately fifteen feet from the Stickdorns' residence.
- Beginning in November 2003, the Stickdorns detected increasingly pungent odors from the Lantzes' farm.
- In February or March 2004, the Lantzes first emptied their manure pit, spreading waste on frozen ground, which caused an overwhelming stench of rotten eggs and raw sewage to invade the Stickdorns' home, making them physically ill.
- The Lantzes continued to empty the manure pit periodically, causing repeated physical illness for the Stickdorns and polluting a stream on their property with waste runoff.
- In response to the Stickdorns' complaints and an investigation by the Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM), the Lantzes were advised to change their manure handling practices but refused to do so.
- The conditions became so intolerable that the Stickdorns were forced to move out of their home in the fall of 2004.
- The Lantzes sold their dairy operation in April 2005, having continued their waste management practices until that time.
Procedural Posture:
- On November 12, 2009, Eric and Lisa Stickdorn filed a complaint against Samuel and Mattie Lantz in an Indiana trial court, alleging claims of negligence, trespass, and nuisance.
- The Lantzes filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Stickdorns' claims were barred by the applicable two-year and six-year statutes of limitations.
- The trial court granted the Lantzes' motion for summary judgment, finding that the cause of action for all claims accrued in October 2003 and was therefore time-barred.
- The Stickdorns, as appellants, appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Court of Appeals of Indiana, with the Lantzes as appellees.
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Issue:
Does the statute of limitations for a nuisance or trespass claim begin to run anew with each subsequent, intermittent injury when the harm is abatable and recurring?
Opinions:
Majority - Baker, Judge
Yes. When a nuisance is intermittent, recurring, and abatable, each new injury gives rise to a new cause of action, and the statute of limitations begins anew with each occurrence. The court distinguished between a 'permanent' nuisance, where the statute of limitations begins when the injury is first discernible, and a 'temporary' or 'continuing' nuisance. Citing precedent from the Indiana Pipe Line cases, the court found that the Lantzes' repeated acts of improperly spreading manure constituted an intermittent and abatable nuisance, not a permanent one stemming from the mere existence of the dairy farm or its manure pit. The harm was not the pit itself, but its recurring use. Therefore, each time the Lantzes spread manure and caused harm to the Stickdorns' property and well-being, a new six-year limitations period was triggered for the nuisance and trespass claims. The trial court erred in concluding that the injury was permanent and accrued in October 2003, as most of the injurious acts occurred after that date and within the six-year period preceding the lawsuit.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the application of the continuing wrong doctrine to nuisance and trespass claims under Indiana law. It establishes a clear precedent that defendants cannot engage in intermittent harmful conduct and then claim immunity under the statute of limitations based on the date of the first injurious act. The decision hinges on the 'abatable' nature of the nuisance; if the defendant could reasonably cease the harmful activity, each new instance constitutes a fresh legal wrong. This protects property owners from being forced to either sue immediately upon the first instance of a recurring harm or forfeit their right to recover for future injuries from the same ongoing conduct.
