Stewart v. Wild
196 Iowa 678 (1923)
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Rule of Law:
An owner's failure to restrain livestock from running at large on a public highway, in violation of both common law and statutory duty, constitutes negligence. A collision between a motor vehicle and such an animal is a foreseeable consequence of that negligence for which the owner may be held liable.
Facts:
- The plaintiff, her husband, and two sons were driving in an automobile on a public highway adjacent to land owned by the defendant.
- Several of the defendant's hogs were in a sunken depression next to the road.
- The defendant, who was standing in his barnyard across the highway, called out to his hogs.
- In response to the defendant's call, the hogs suddenly ran out of the depression and onto the traveled portion of the highway.
- The hogs ran directly into the path of the plaintiff's oncoming automobile.
- The vehicle struck one of the hogs, causing the automobile to overturn.
- The plaintiff and the other occupants were thrown from the car and injured.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant in the state trial court, seeking damages for injuries caused by negligence.
- The defendant filed a demurrer to the plaintiff's petition, arguing that the facts alleged did not constitute a valid legal claim for negligence.
- The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer, effectively dismissing the plaintiff's lawsuit.
- The plaintiff appealed the trial court's decision to the Supreme Court of Iowa.
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Issue:
Does an owner's failure to restrain their hogs from running at large on a public highway, in violation of a statute, constitute actionable negligence when a hog causes a collision with an automobile?
Opinions:
Majority - Evans, J.
Yes. An owner's failure to restrain their hogs from running at large on a public highway constitutes a breach of a legal duty, and a resulting collision with a motor vehicle is a foreseeable, proximate result of that breach. The petition sufficiently alleged two forms of negligence: 1) negligently permitting hogs to run at large on the highway, and 2) affirmatively calling the hogs into the path of an oncoming car. The court found the first allegation alone was sufficient. Both common law and Iowa statute (§ 2314) impose a legal duty on owners to restrain swine from running at large on public highways. A breach of this duty constitutes negligence. The court rejected the argument that a collision with an automobile was not a foreseeable or proximate result of the negligence. It reasoned that while such a collision might have been unforeseeable in the era of slow, ox-drawn vehicles, the prevalence and speed of modern motor vehicles makes a collision a probable and foreseeable danger. Therefore, the question of whether the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury is a question of fact for a jury to decide, not a matter of law to be dismissed by a judge.
Dissenting - Stevens, J.
This justice dissented from the majority opinion but did not provide a written explanation for their reasoning.
Analysis:
This decision adapts traditional common law principles regarding livestock to the realities of the automotive age. It establishes that the legal concept of proximate cause is not static but evolves with societal and technological changes. By holding that a collision between a car and a loose animal is a foreseeable event, the court broadened the scope of liability for animal owners adjacent to public highways. This case solidifies the principle that violating a public safety statute designed to prevent a certain type of harm can be treated as presumptive evidence of negligence (negligence per se), and it confirms that the question of foreseeability in such cases is typically a matter for the jury to decide.
