Stevens v. Quick
678 A.2d 28, 1996 WL 335250 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
District of Columbia parole regulations grant the parole board discretionary authority to set a parole reconsideration date it deems appropriate; therefore, these regulations do not create a protected liberty interest in parole or a specific reconsideration timeline.
Facts:
- In 1983, Bertram T. Stevens was convicted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for robbery and second-degree murder.
- In 1987, while serving his sentence at the Lorton Correctional Complex, Stevens committed another crime, leading to a conviction in federal court for intent to murder.
- Stevens' sentences were combined into an aggregated 'mixed' District of Columbia and federal sentence of eight to thirty-nine years.
- After his federal conviction, Stevens was transferred to a federal prison where he completed educational programs.
- In February 1993, the United States Parole Commission, applying D.C. parole regulations, denied Stevens parole.
- The Commission scheduled Stevens' next parole reconsideration hearing for five years later, imposing a five-year 'setoff'.
Procedural Posture:
- Bertram T. Stevens filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the trial court of first instance.
- Stevens alleged that the U.S. Parole Commission violated D.C. regulations with a five-year parole setoff and that he was improperly denied educational good time credits.
- The trial court denied the petition, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction and the matter should have been filed in federal court.
- Stevens, as appellant, appealed the trial court's dismissal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, with the District of Columbia as appellee.
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Issue:
Do District of Columbia parole regulations, which state that parole reconsideration for certain inmates 'shall ordinarily occur within twelve (12) months,' prohibit the U.S. Parole Commission from imposing a five-year period before the next parole reconsideration hearing?
Opinions:
Majority - Reid, Associate Judge
No. The parole regulations do not prohibit a five-year setoff because they grant the parole authority broad discretion to set an appropriate reconsideration date. The court's analysis focused on the plain language of the D.C. parole regulations. It found that 28 DCMR § 104.2, which states reconsideration 'shall ordinarily occur within twelve (12) months,' is not a mandatory command due to the qualifying word 'ordinarily.' This interpretation is reinforced by 28 DCMR § 104.11, which explicitly grants the Board authority to 'order a parole reconsideration date it determines to be appropriate.' Therefore, the U.S. Parole Commission did not abuse its discretion. Consequently, Stevens' claim of a protected liberty interest fails because the regulations are discretionary, not mandatory. The court declined to address Stevens' claim for educational good time credits because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by first raising the issue with the Department of Corrections.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the discretionary nature of the D.C. parole board's authority, affirming that inmates lack a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole or a specific reconsideration schedule under these regulations. It demonstrates how qualifying language, such as 'ordinarily,' in a statute or regulation can defeat claims of a mandatory entitlement, thereby limiting due process challenges. The case also serves as a notable example of an appellate court employing the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction, choosing to bypass a complex jurisdictional question to resolve the case on clearer, substantive grounds where the petitioner's claim on the merits is plainly without legal support.
