Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service
1994 WL 561233, 36 F.3d 457 (1994)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The acquisition of electronic communications is not an unlawful 'intercept' under Title I of the Federal Wiretap Act if the acquisition is not contemporaneous with the transmission of those communications, but rather occurs while the communications are in electronic storage.
Facts:
- Steve Jackson Games, Incorporated (SJG) operated an electronic bulletin board system (BBS) called 'Illuminati' from a company computer.
- The BBS allowed users to send and receive private electronic mail (E-mail), which was stored on the BBS computer's hard drive until the recipient logged in to read it.
- An SJG employee, Loyd Blankenship, was the subject of a Secret Service investigation related to the unauthorized distribution of a Bell Company text file.
- The Secret Service obtained a warrant to search SJG's premises, believing Blankenship could use the SJG BBS computer in relation to the investigation.
- On March 1, 1990, the Secret Service executed the warrant and seized the computer that operated the BBS.
- At the time of the seizure, the computer's hard drive contained 162 items of unread, private E-mail addressed to various users, including the individual appellants.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellants, Steve Jackson Games, Inc. and several individuals, filed a civil suit against the United States Secret Service in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas.
- The complaint alleged violations of, among other things, Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) for unlawful interception and Title II of the ECPA for unlawful access to stored communications.
- The district court (a trial court) found that the Secret Service had violated Title II by accessing the stored emails and awarded damages to the individual appellants.
- The district court, however, ruled in favor of the Secret Service on the Title I claim, holding that seizing stored, unread emails was not an 'interception' because the acquisition was not contemporaneous with the transmission.
- The appellants (Steve Jackson Games, et al.) appealed the district court's decision on the Title I interception claim to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the seizure of a computer containing unread private electronic mail that is in electronic storage constitute an unlawful 'intercept' of an electronic communication under the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)?
Opinions:
Majority - Barksdale
No. The seizure of a computer containing unread electronic mail in storage does not constitute an unlawful 'intercept' under the Federal Wiretap Act. The Act's definition of 'intercept' requires the acquisition of a communication to be contemporaneous with its transmission. The court reasoned that the statutory framework of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) creates two distinct titles for governing electronic communications: Title I applies to the 'interception' of communications in transit, while Title II applies to accessing communications in 'electronic storage.' Critically, the statutory definition of 'electronic communication' is limited to the 'transfer' of data and, unlike the definition of 'wire communication,' explicitly does not include 'any electronic storage of such communication.' Because the unread E-mails were in electronic storage on the BBS computer's hard drive, they were no longer in transit. Therefore, acquiring them by seizing the computer was governed by the standards of Title II (access to stored communications), not the more stringent standards of Title I (interception).
Analysis:
This decision established a foundational distinction in electronic privacy law between communications in transit and those at rest. By narrowly interpreting 'intercept' to mean contemporaneous acquisition, the court clarified that different legal standards and procedural requirements apply to law enforcement's access of live data transmissions versus stored data. This ruling significantly shaped the application of the ECPA to internet technologies, creating a bright-line rule that accessing stored emails on a server is not a 'wiretap' under Title I, but rather an issue of accessing stored communications under Title II. This precedent ensures that law enforcement can use a standard search warrant to obtain stored emails, rather than needing to meet the higher, more complex requirements for a wiretap order.
