No. The court said Velsicol does not have to pay for just increasing the residents' risk of getting cancer. To get money for a future illness, you have to prove it's more than a 50/50 chance you'll actually get it, and the residents couldn't do that. However, the court said Velsicol DOES have to pay the residents for the fear and anxiety they live with every day, because that fear is a real, current injury. The court also rejected some other claims, like for 'immune system damage,' because the science the residents' expert used was considered unproven and unreliable by the mainstream scientific community.

I agree with the final outcome, but I think the main judge was too strict. When a big company pollutes with dangerous chemicals and people get sick, the court should assume the company is to blame. Then, the company should have to prove it wasn't their fault. This would make it fairer for the victims.

Yes, Velsicol is responsible because it was very careless in the way it dumped the dangerous chemicals. It knew how harmful the chemicals were but didn't do enough to stop them from leaking out and hurting people. The evidence shows the chemicals got into people's drinking water and could cause the kinds of health problems they had.

But the court made some mistakes in deciding how much money to award. The people needed to prove more clearly that certain health issues were definitely caused by the chemicals. They can't get money for illnesses they might get in the future - only for ones they already have. The court also shouldn't have added extra money for the time before the trial. 

It was okay for the court to order extra punishment money because Velsicol acted so badly, but it needs to decide on the right amount. So in the end, Velsicol has to pay for the harm it caused, but the court needs to go back and fix some of the dollar amounts.

I mostly agree with the main opinion but have a slightly different view on what needs to be proven about the health problems. 

The main opinion is too strict in saying the people's doctors needed to use specific words. If the evidence overall shows the people were exposed to the chemicals and have injuries that match what those chemicals can cause, the court should be able to conclude the chemicals were the likely cause.

When the case goes back to the lower court, I think it should be allowed to assume the chemicals caused the injuries unless Velsicol can prove otherwise. The main opinion makes it too hard for the people to link their injuries to the chemicals in my view.

No. Under Tennessee law, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover damages for an unquantified increased risk of a future disease without proving to a reasonable medical certainty that the disease is more likely than not to occur. The court found that damages for increased risk require a plaintiff to prove a probability (more than a 50 percent chance) that the future disease will manifest, which the plaintiffs failed to do, as their experts testified only to a 25-30 percent risk. However, the court affirmed that damages for the reasonable fear of future disease ('cancerphobia') are compensable as a present emotional injury, though it found the district court's awards excessive and recalculated them based on the duration of exposure. The court reversed awards for immune system impairment, finding the expert testimony on 'clinical ecology' failed to meet the standard of general acceptance in the scientific community under Fed. R. Evid. 702. It also reversed awards for PTSD, holding that consumption of contaminated water is not the type of 'recognizable stressor' required for such a diagnosis.

The majority applies the 'reasonable medical certainty' standard of proof too rigidly. In complex toxic tort cases, once a plaintiff provides expert testimony on a chemical's properties and proves exposure followed by injury, a rebuttable presumption of proximate causation should arise. This would appropriately shift the burden to the defendant to disprove the causal link. The district court should be permitted to engage in this form of burden-shifting on remand.

Yes, Velsicol is liable because its creation, maintenance, and operation of the chemical waste landfill site constituted gross negligence and a willful and wanton disregard for the plaintiffs' health and well-being. Velsicol had superior knowledge about the highly toxic nature of the chemicals it disposed of but failed to take adequate precautions to prevent contamination, such as using protective liners in the trenches. The evidence shows the chemicals contaminated the plaintiffs' drinking water wells, and medical testimony established that the contaminants were capable of causing the types of injuries alleged by the plaintiffs. 

However, the district court erred in some of its damage awards. The plaintiffs failed to prove to a reasonable medical certainty that all of their specific injuries were caused by ingesting the contaminated water, so certain awards must be recalculated. Damages for increased risk of future disease were too speculative. The court also erred in awarding prejudgment interest on personal injury damages, which is not allowed under Tennessee law. 

The award of punitive damages was proper based on Velsicol's reckless conduct, but must be recalculated since the court considered some improper factors. In sum, Velsicol is liable for compensatory damages proximately caused by its negligence and for punitive damages, but the amounts must be recalculated consistent with the evidence and Tennessee law. The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

I concur in the judgment and much of the majority's reasoning, but write separately regarding the degree of proof required for damages. The majority applies the 'reasonable medical certainty' standard too rigidly. 

As this court noted in Thompson v. Underwood, 407 F.2d 994 (6th Cir. 1969), 'reasonable medical certainty' is a general rule and magic words are not required. The trier of fact should be allowed to infer causation if there is sufficient proof of exposure and injury, even if experts do not say the magic words. 

On remand, I would allow the district court to apply a rebuttable presumption of causation if the record as a whole supports it. If the defendant fails to rebut the presumption, the court may find reasonable medical certainty. The majority's approach is overly restrictive in my view.

Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corporation

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