Stephens v. Miller
13 F.3d 998, 513 U.S. 808 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant's constitutional right to testify is not absolute and may be limited by a state's rape shield statute, provided the evidentiary restriction is not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes the statute is designed to serve, such as protecting victims from harassment and invasions of privacy.
Facts:
- On March 17, 1987, Lonnie Stephens went to Melissa Wilburn's trailer, where she was asleep on the couch while her sister, brother-in-law, son, and nephew slept in other rooms.
- Wilburn testified that Stephens entered her trailer uninvited, attempted to kiss her, and then physically assaulted her on the couch before she pushed him off and ran screaming into another room.
- Stephens testified that the encounter was entirely consensual, starting with conversation and kissing, and progressing to sexual intercourse on the floor.
- Stephens sought to testify that during what he claimed was consensual intercourse, he made specific comments to Wilburn, including asking "[d]on’t you like it like this? ... Tim Hall said you did" and referencing "switching partners."
- Stephens claimed these specific comments angered Wilburn, causing her to order him to stop and leave, which he did.
- After leaving Wilburn's trailer, Stephens went to a friend's house and initially lied to them and to police about his whereabouts, claiming he had been at a Pic a Pac store.
- Stephens also instructed his friend, David Stone, who had driven him to Wilburn's trailer, to lie to police and corroborate the Pic a Pac story.
Procedural Posture:
- Lonnie K. Stephens was charged with attempted rape in an Indiana state trial court.
- During his trial, the court applied Indiana's Rape Shield Statute to exclude specific statements Stephens sought to testify that he had made to the complainant.
- A jury convicted Stephens of attempted rape.
- Stephens appealed his conviction to the Indiana Supreme Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Stephens then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, alleging a constitutional violation.
- The district court denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
- Stephens, the petitioner-appellant, appealed the district court's denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the application of Indiana's Rape Shield Statute to exclude a defendant's specific testimony about a victim's alleged past sexual conduct, which the defendant claims he mentioned during a consensual sexual encounter causing her to become angry and fabricate an attempted rape charge, violate the defendant's constitutional right to testify?
Opinions:
Majority - Bauer, Circuit Judge
No. The application of Indiana's Rape Shield Statute did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to testify. A defendant's right to testify is not unlimited and may be subject to procedural and evidentiary rules that serve legitimate state interests. Rape shield statutes serve the valid purposes of protecting victims from harassment, surprise, and unnecessary invasions of privacy. The trial court's restriction was not arbitrary or disproportionate because it still allowed Stephens to testify that he said something that angered Wilburn and caused her to fabricate the charge, thereby presenting the core of his defense. The exclusion of the specific, inflammatory statements about alleged past sexual conduct directly served the statute's purpose, and the Constitution requires no more than the balance struck by the trial court.
Concurring - Flaum, Circuit Judge
No. While the restriction on Stephens' testimony was more than a 'very minor imposition,' it was constitutionally permissible because the excluded testimony was not sufficiently central to his defense to outweigh the significant state interests served by the rape shield statute. The Supreme Court's precedents in cases like Michigan v. Lucas and Maryland v. Craig indicate a trend toward allowing states to limit a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to serve important external policy interests, such as protecting victims. Here, the excluded evidence was not 'critical' in the way a third-party confession would be; its link to a motive to fabricate was conjectural, and Stephens was still able to present his theory that his words angered the complainant. Thus, the application of the statute was not arbitrary or disproportionate.
Concurring - Rovner, Circuit Judge
No. The constitutional balancing performed by the other opinions is unnecessary because Stephens did not actually offer the excluded testimony to support a theory of fabrication or to impeach the witness. A review of the trial record, including the offer of proof and closing arguments, shows that Stephens's counsel offered the testimony solely to explain why Wilburn withdrew her previously given consent and told him to leave. The theory that Wilburn fabricated the charge out of anger was not presented at trial; instead, Stephens's counsel argued she fabricated the charge to placate her landlady. As the testimony was not offered for the constitutionally weighty purpose of showing a motive to fabricate, the state's interest in excluding it under the rape shield statute easily prevails.
Dissenting - Cummings, Circuit Judge
Yes. The application of the rape shield statute violated Stephens' constitutional right to present a defense. The excluded statements were the cornerstone of his defense, as their plausibility turned on whether the jury believed his words could have so enraged the complainant that she would fabricate a rape charge in retaliation. By allowing him only to say he said 'something' that angered her, the court eviscerated his defense, asking him to counter a vivid prosecution narrative with an expunged and unbelievable version of events. When evidence has such genuine exculpatory potential, the state's interest in protecting the victim from embarrassment must yield to the defendant's fundamental right to present his case.
Dissenting - Cudahy, Circuit Judge
Yes. The state's interest in its rape shield law must give way to the defendant's right to present a defense, particularly when the evidence is offered to show a motive to fabricate. The proffered testimony was not intended to prove the truth of the victim's past conduct or to argue about consent, but to show the effect of the words on the listener and provide a motive for a false accusation. Citing Davis v. Alaska, which established a defendant's right to introduce evidence of witness bias, this case is analogous because Stephens sought to show the complainant had a reason to lie. Every court applying Davis to rape shield laws has found they cannot be used to block evidence of a motive to fabricate, and the Constitution requires that Stephens be permitted to introduce this evidence.
Dissenting - Coffey, Circuit Judge
Yes. A middle path should have been taken to respect both the defendant's rights and the state's interests. The testimony was not about the victim's past conduct but about a contemporaneous statement that formed the heart of the defense by explaining the alleged abrupt end to a consensual encounter. Denying Stephens the opportunity to state the 'repulsive language' he allegedly used, while allowing only a bland paraphrase, falls far short of conveying the impact of the words and undermines his credibility. The court should have allowed Stephens to testify about the 'doggie fashion' comment, which was central to his defense, while excluding the names of prior partners, thereby balancing the competing interests.
Dissenting - Ripple, Circuit Judge
Yes. The court's decision represents a radical departure from Supreme Court precedent protecting an accused's fundamental right to tell his or her story to the jury in his or her own words. The excluded testimony was not peripheral but was central to explaining the defendant's version of the actual criminal act. To limit the defendant to testifying that he said 'something' that angered the victim deprived the jury of the essence of his testimony, as the rawness of the alleged statement is what would have given it substance. This restriction not only gutted his defense but also unfairly portrayed him to the jury as evasive and less than frank, creating a haunting fear that an innocent person may have been convicted because the jury was not allowed to hear both sides of the story.
Analysis:
This case exemplifies the profound constitutional tension between a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and the state's compelling interest in protecting sexual assault victims through rape shield statutes. The court's decision reinforces the principle that the right to testify is not absolute and can be curtailed by well-established evidentiary rules. It affirms that a case-by-case balancing test is required, where courts must weigh the specific probative value of the excluded evidence to the defense against the state's interest in preventing victim harassment and privacy invasion. The ruling suggests that as long as a defendant can present the 'core' of their defense theory (e.g., that 'something' was said to provoke a false accusation), excluding the specific, inflammatory details may be a constitutionally permissible restriction.
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