Stephen Ustrak v. James W. Fairman
851 F.2d 983, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 9644 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
When a plaintiff prevails on only some of their factually and legally distinct claims, the attorney's fee award should be calculated by first eliminating any hours that are facially unreasonable and then reducing the remaining hours to reflect a reasonable estimate of the time that would have been expended had the litigation been confined solely to the successful claims.
Facts:
- Stephen Ustrak was an inmate in an Illinois state prison.
- In June 1979, Ustrak, who is white, requested a job in the prison library and was denied, which he alleged was on racial grounds.
- In July 1980, Ustrak faced a disciplinary matter in which he alleged he was subject to racial discrimination.
- In October 1980, Ustrak's request to be transferred to a less restrictive part of the prison was denied.
- Ustrak alleged this denial of transfer was in retaliation for his exercise of free speech.
Procedural Posture:
- Stephen Ustrak sued the prison warden in the U.S. District Court, alleging six counts of civil rights violations.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the warden on two counts.
- Following a jury trial on the remaining four counts, the jury found for Ustrak and awarded him almost $50,000.
- The warden appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment on three of the four counts, leaving only the retaliation claim, and reduced Ustrak's damages award to $1,001.
- On remand to the district court for the attorney's fee determination, Ustrak's counsel requested over $50,000.
- The district court reduced the requested hours by one-third for lack of success and awarded approximately $30,000 in fees.
- The warden appealed the district court's fee award to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a district court abuse its discretion in calculating an attorney's fee award for a partially successful plaintiff by failing to exclude time spent on unsuccessful, factually distinct claims and by including hours that are clearly excessive?
Opinions:
Majority - Posner, Circuit Judge
Yes. A district court abuses its discretion when it fails to adequately reduce an attorney's fee award to account for a plaintiff's limited success on factually distinct claims. The proper method is not a simple pro-rata reduction based on the number of successful counts, but rather a counterfactual analysis to determine the fees that would have been reasonably incurred had the suit been confined to only the meritorious claim. The court found several of the law firm's billed hours to be patently excessive, such as 38 hours for appeal preparation and over 100 hours for drafting fee petitions, referring to the latter as 'the tail wagging the dog.' After striking these excessive hours, the court estimated that litigating only the single successful retaliation claim would have reasonably required half the remaining time. The court also held that a fee award significantly larger than the damages award is permissible in civil rights cases, as the value of vindicating constitutional rights and deterring future violations extends beyond the monetary recovery.
Analysis:
This case refines the Supreme Court's framework from Hensley v. Eckerhart for calculating attorney's fees in cases with partial success. Instead of a simple mathematical formula (e.g., reducing fees by 5/6ths for winning on 1 of 6 claims), Judge Posner introduces a 'counterfactual' approach. This requires courts to estimate the hypothetical cost of litigating only the successful claim, which provides more flexibility but also introduces more subjectivity. The opinion also reflects a growing judicial impatience with excessive fee litigation, signaling that appellate courts will scrutinize fee requests rigorously and, to promote judicial economy, may modify fee awards directly rather than remanding.
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