Stephen Linder v. Darryl McPherson
937 F.3d 1087 (2019)
Rule of Law:
The 'law enforcement proviso' of the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)) does not override the 'discretionary function exception' (28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)); therefore, the government remains immune from liability for malicious prosecution claims arising from the discretionary acts of law enforcement officers.
Facts:
- Stephen Linder, a Deputy U.S. Marshal, interrogated the father of a fugitive while tracking the fugitive down.
- Another deputy marshal alleged that Linder punched the father in the face during the interrogation.
- Following an internal investigation, Linder was indicted for federal felonies, including witness tampering and using excessive force.
- Linder was placed on leave pending the resolution of the criminal charges.
- Darryl McPherson, the U.S. Marshal for the Northern District of Illinois, issued an order instructing other deputies not to communicate with Linder or his attorneys without prior approval.
- Linder contended that this restriction prevented his legal team from interviewing potential witnesses necessary for his defense.
- Linder subsequently sought damages from the government, alleging malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the handling of the investigation and the restrictive personnel order.
Procedural Posture:
- Linder sued McPherson and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, asserting claims under Bivens and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
- The District Court dismissed the Bivens claims, which Linder subsequently abandoned.
- The District Court dismissed the FTCA claims, ruling that the government was immune under the discretionary function exception.
- Linder appealed the dismissal of the FTCA claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the law enforcement proviso in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) waive the United States' sovereign immunity for malicious prosecution claims even when the underlying conduct falls within the discretionary function exception of § 2680(a)?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Easterbrook
No, the law enforcement proviso does not nullify the discretionary function exception; statutory exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) still apply to claims allowed by the proviso. The court reasoned that § 2680(h) explicitly states that the 'provisions of this chapter' apply to the exempted claims. Since 'this chapter' includes § 2680(a)—the discretionary function exception—law enforcement officers are still shielded from liability when their actions involve discretionary judgment. To read the statute otherwise would absurdly remove subject-matter jurisdiction and statutes of limitations. Applying this to the facts, the court found that Marshal McPherson's order restricting communication involved an element of judgment grounded in public policy regarding workforce management and internal discord, thus satisfying the discretionary function test. Additionally, while perjury is not discretionary, Linder suffered no actionable harm from alleged perjury because his indictment was dismissed.
Analysis:
This decision deepens a circuit split regarding the interpretation of the FTCA's 'law enforcement proviso.' The Seventh Circuit explicitly rejects the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Nguyen v. United States, establishing a stricter standard for plaintiffs suing the federal government for law enforcement misconduct. By ruling that the discretionary function exception applies even to the intentional torts listed in the § 2680(h) proviso, the court significantly limits the government's exposure to liability. Practically, this means federal law enforcement agencies can claim immunity for administrative and investigative decisions—such as isolating an employee under suspicion—as long as those decisions involve policy judgments, even if those decisions contribute to a claim of malicious prosecution.
