Stephen Boswell v. Amber Dawn Steele
348 P.3d 497, 158 Idaho 554, 2015 Ida. App. LEXIS 27 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
An owner of a domesticated animal may be liable for injuries it causes if the owner knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious or dangerous propensities, even without a separate showing of a failure to exercise ordinary care. Liability can also arise under general negligence, premises liability duties, or as negligence per se for violations of relevant statutes or ordinances, provided factual disputes preclude summary judgment.
Facts:
- Mary Steele owned a house in Pocatello where she lived with her granddaughter, Amber Steele.
- Mary owned a Shih Tzu and Amber owned a Scottish Terrier named Zoey; both dogs resided at the property.
- A fence enclosed the backyard, and "Beware of Dog" signs were posted on the property gates.
- Amber typically kept Zoey in a basement room when leaving the house, but when Zoey was upstairs, Mary used a gate to confine both dogs in the kitchen.
- Stephen Boswell drove Mary Steele, his mother-in-law, home after she visited with the Boswells.
- Upon entering Mary’s residence, Stephen and Mary found the two dogs in the kitchen behind the gate, with Zoey barking and growling.
- Without Mary’s knowledge, Stephen walked to the gate and extended his right hand with a closed fist towards Zoey.
- Zoey bit a piece of flesh off the back of Stephen Boswell's hand, which required hospital treatment.
- Prior to this incident, Zoey had bitten one of Amber's friends at a barbeque party (drawing blood) and another friend at a separate party (also drawing blood), neither of which were reported to authorities.
- Stephen Boswell admitted in his deposition that he did not perceive Zoey as dangerous before the incident and believed Mary had done nothing wrong in securing the dogs behind the gate.
- Karena Boswell, Stephen's wife, stated to an animal control officer that she had previously witnessed Zoey bite an individual.
Procedural Posture:
- Stephen and Karena Boswell (the Boswells) filed a complaint alleging strict liability, negligence, premises liability, and negligence per se against Amber Dawn Steele and the Estate of Mary Steele (the Steeles) in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bannock County.
- Both parties moved for summary judgment.
- The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Steeles, struck an affidavit of an animal control officer, and denied the Boswells’ request to depose an insurance adjuster.
- The case was subsequently reassigned to another district judge.
- The Boswells filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied.
- The district court entered a judgment in favor of the Steeles, dismissing the Boswells’ claims.
- The Boswells (plaintiffs-appellants) timely appealed the district court’s order granting summary judgment and denying their motion to reconsider to the Idaho Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a genuine issue of material fact exist regarding the Steeles' liability under claims of owner liability for an animal with vicious tendencies, negligence, premises liability, negligence per se, and a private cause of action under a municipal ordinance, thereby precluding summary judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - Walters, Judge Pro Tem
Yes, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the Steeles' liability under various claims, precluding summary judgment. The district court erred in granting summary judgment because several material facts remained disputed, and the Steeles were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For a claim of owner liability based on an animal's vicious tendencies, the court reiterated that an owner is liable if they knew or should have known of the animal's dangerous propensity, citing McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n and Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc. The two prior biting incidents, though not severe, created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Steeles had notice of Zoey's vicious propensity. For the general negligence claim, whether the prior incidents provided sufficient notice, whether the "Beware of Dog" signs and kitchen gate were adequate precautions, and whether Stephen provoked the dog were all disputed facts for a jury. Regarding premises liability, Stephen, as a social guest (licensee), was owed a duty by Mary Steele to be warned of known dangerous conditions. The prior biting incidents raised a factual dispute as to whether Mary knew of Zoey's dangerousness and failed to warn Stephen, and whether the general warning signs were sufficient for a guest inside the home. For negligence per se, the court found disputed facts under Pocatello Municipal Code (PMC) 6.04.050(A) (dangerous conduct by animal), PMC 6.04.060 (restraint requirements for dangerous animals), and Idaho Code § 25-2805 (securing vicious dogs). Stephen's testimony that Zoey was excited and wagging her tail created a dispute over provocation, and the kitchen gate's adequacy as a "secure enclosure" was also challenged. Finally, the court held that PMC 6.04.050(E) explicitly creates a private cause of action for injuries caused by a dangerous animal, and the existence of provocation or whether Zoey met the definition of a "dangerous animal" were disputed facts. Additionally, the district court erred in quashing the subpoena to depose an insurance adjuster, as the Boswells sought to discover the identity of a potential witness to another biting incident, which is not protected work product, and the subpoena was quashed prematurely before specific work product objections could be made during the deposition.
Analysis:
This case clarifies Idaho's standard for animal owner liability, emphasizing that prior knowledge of an animal's vicious tendencies creates a basis for liability without requiring a separate showing of ordinary care failure, which helps define the scope of the 'one bite rule.' It reinforces the high evidentiary bar for summary judgment in tort cases, particularly where factual disputes concerning prior knowledge, provocation, or adequacy of warnings exist, ensuring such matters are resolved by a jury. Furthermore, the ruling highlights the potential for municipal ordinances to create distinct private causes of action for animal-related injuries, independent of common law torts, thereby expanding avenues for recourse. Finally, the decision provides important clarification on the limits of work-product privilege, confirming that information leading to the discovery of potential witnesses is generally discoverable.
