Yes, the judge made a big mistake. The appeals court said the jury should have been told that bad behavior caused by a disability is part of the disability itself. You can't separate the two. Firing someone for their disability's symptoms is the same as firing them for having the disability, which is illegal. DaVita argued it was firing her for misconduct, but the court said that if the illness *caused* the misconduct, it's all connected. This doesn't mean employees with disabilities have a free pass to do anything, but it means employers must be very careful not to punish them for symptoms of their illness. However, the court said the company's win on a separate claim about medical leave was okay, because it was clear the firing was about the outburst, not about her taking time off.

Yes, the lower court made a big mistake by not telling the jury the right thing. In Washington, the law says that if someone does something because of their disability, that action is part of the disability. It can't be a separate reason for firing them. The appeals court has said the same thing about federal disability law. In this case, Gambini showed evidence that her outburst at work happened because of her bipolar disorder, since she was having problems with her medication. The jury should have been allowed to decide if Gambini's actions were caused by her disability and if DaVita fired her because of her disability. By not explaining the law correctly to the jury, the lower court messed up, and it wasn't a harmless mistake. The law protects people from being fired for their disability and actions caused by their disability. But an employee still has to show they can do the main parts of their job with or without help, and the employer can give reasons like the employee being a danger to others or it being too hard to accommodate them.

—finding plaintiff entitled to instruction to jury that, "Conduct resulting from a disability is part of the disability and not a separate basis for termination

The court stated that "where an employee demonstrates a causal link between the disability-produced conduct and the termination, a jury must be instructed that it may find that the employee was terminated on the impermissible basis of her disability

Thus, no party can demonstrate what the jury found as to when breach occurred, and BladeRoom cannot refute the presumption of prejudice.

Gambini forewarned: "[I] f the law fails to protect the manifestations of [a] disability, there is no real protection in the law because it would protect the disabled in name only."

Clark's citation to Gambini is also unpersuasive; at best, the parenthetical he offers is tangentially related to the "qualified individual" issue, and the Gambini court applied Washington Supreme Court precedent to Washington state law.

T] he jury was entitled to infer reasonably that [the plaintiff's] `violent outburst'... was a consequence of her bipolar disorder, which the law protects as part and parcel of her disability

—we have not directly addressed which party bears the ultimate burden of proof when an employer alleges that he had a legitimate reason not to reinstate an employee.

Thus, the plaintiff must establish that he can perform the essential functions of the job he desires, with or without reasonable accommodation.

Yes, a trial court's refusal to give such an instruction is reversible error. The Washington Supreme Court has explicitly held that conduct resulting from a disability is part of the disability and not a separate basis for termination. This principle, derived from federal ADA precedent like *Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Ass’n*, requires that where an employee shows a causal link between disability-produced conduct and termination, the jury must be instructed that it may find the termination was impermissibly based on the disability. In this case, Gambini presented evidence that her 'violent outburst,' for which DaVita admitted it fired her, was a symptom of her bipolar disorder. The failure to provide the requested instruction was not harmless because it likely misled the jury into believing it could separate Gambini's conduct from her disability, which is contrary to Washington law. The verdict on the FMLA claim is affirmed, however, as any error in the FMLA jury instructions was harmless because DaVita presented unrefuted evidence it would have fired Gambini for her conduct regardless of her leave status.

Yes, the district court committed reversible error by refusing to give the proposed jury instruction. Under Washington law, as articulated by the state Supreme Court in Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., conduct resulting from a disability is considered part of the disability rather than a separate basis for termination. The Ninth Circuit has also recognized this rule in the ADA context in Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Ass'n. Here, Gambini presented evidence that her emotional outburst was a consequence of her bipolar disorder, as she was in the throes of a medication change. The jury was entitled to find that Gambini's conduct was caused by her disability and that DaVita's termination decision was therefore impermissibly based on her disability. By refusing to instruct the jury that conduct resulting from a disability is part and parcel of the disability itself, the district court failed to accurately state the law, and this error was not harmless. The law protects the disability as well as the conduct caused by the disability. However, an employee must still show she can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation, and an employer may raise defenses such as business necessity, threat to health and safety, or undue burden.

Stephanie Gambini v. Total Renal Care, Inc., D/B/A Davita, Inc.

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