Steele v. State
1980 Wisc. LEXIS 2618, 294 N.W.2d 2, 97 Wis. 2d 72 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
In Wisconsin's bifurcated criminal trials, expert opinion testimony regarding a defendant's mental capacity to form a specific intent is inadmissible during the guilt phase, as the state's interest in maintaining the integrity and purpose of the bifurcated trial system provides a sufficient justification for this exclusion, and such evidence is deemed unreliable for determining specific intent.
Facts:
- Richard A. Steele and his wife, Joan, were separated, though no legal proceedings for divorce or separation had begun.
- Joan Steele was temporarily living in the Emil Hanson residence with the couple's son, Richard A. Steele, Jr., who was in foster care.
- On January 28, 1974, Richard Steele learned Joan was at the foster home and became angry when social worker Janet Frost explained the temporary residence, threatening that if Joan stayed there, he would get a gun and 'blow her head off'.
- On February 4, 1974, after a joint conference with Dr. Anderson where divorce was suggested, Richard Steele struck Joan Steele in the face and knocked her to the ground; later that day, he told Frost, 'You can’t guard her all the time. I’ll get her sooner or later'.
- On February 5, 1974, after a county judge awarded custody of the child to the Monroe County Welfare Department for placement in the Hanson residence, Richard Steele threatened Frost that if he was not allowed to see his son, 'there would be bodies from here to Winona', and also threatened to kill his wife.
- On February 7, 1974, Steele's request for a twenty-four-hour visitation with his child for the child's upcoming birthday was denied by the county judge, who cited a doctor's recommendation.
- On the morning of February 11, 1974, after again being denied visitation by the county judge, Richard Steele went to a sporting goods shop and bought a .22 caliber revolver.
- Richard Steele then went to the Hanson residence, became embroiled in an argument with Joan Steele, and fired six shots into her body, causing her death.
Procedural Posture:
- Richard A. Steele was charged with first-degree murder of his wife, Joan, and a jury found him guilty and found he did not have a mental disease or defect that would exonerate him.
- Judgment of conviction was entered on July 22, 1974.
- Richard Steele appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by excluding expert opinion testimony on his capacity to intend to kill during the guilt phase.
- While Steele's appeal was pending, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided Hughes v. Mathews, reversing a Wisconsin conviction on grounds that excluding psychiatric evidence to rebut intent in a single-phase trial created an unconstitutional conclusive presumption.
- Following Hughes, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Schimmel v. State, extending Hughes's rationale to bifurcated trials and holding that psychiatric evidence of mental state was admissible in the guilt phase.
- Steele filed a motion for summary reversal based on Schimmel, which was denied, and his appeal was argued on its merits.
- Before the intended release of the opinion, the United States Supreme Court decided Ulster County Court v. Allen and Sandstrom v. Montana, prompting the Wisconsin Supreme Court to order further briefs and reargument on specific questions related to these new precedents and the workability of bifurcated trials.
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Issue:
Does the exclusion of expert opinion testimony regarding a defendant's mental capacity to form specific intent during the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial violate a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense, or is it justified by the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of the bifurcated trial system?
Opinions:
Majority - HEFFERNAN, J.
No, the exclusion of expert opinion testimony regarding a defendant's mental capacity to form specific intent during the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial does not violate a defendant's constitutional right and is justified by the state's legitimate interests in maintaining the integrity and purpose of the bifurcated trial system. The court overrules its previous decision in Schimmel v. State, which had incorrectly extended the rationale of Hughes v. Mathews to bifurcated trials. The Hughes decision explicitly reserved judgment on bifurcated trials and found a constitutional infirmity only when a presumption of intent was coupled with the exclusion of all evidence to rebut it, which was not the case in Wisconsin's bifurcated system. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reaffirms its long-standing precedent, articulated in cases like State ex rel. La Follette v. Raskin, Curl v. State, and State v. Hebard, which established the bifurcated trial system (codified in sec. 971.175, Stats.) as a crucial mechanism to protect a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination while also allowing for a full determination of both guilt and mental responsibility. Admitting expert opinion testimony on mental capacity to form intent during the guilt phase would largely duplicate the inquiry into mental disease or defect during the insanity phase, effectively vitiating the separation of issues, confusing the jury, and undermining the state's interest in committing insane persons for treatment rather than outright acquitting those who merely raise doubt about intent. Furthermore, the court expresses substantial doubt about the scientific soundness, trustworthiness, and probative value of psychiatric testimony concerning a defendant's precise capacity to form a specific intent, distinguishing it from the 'gross evaluation' of criminal responsibility. While other evidence bearing on intent (e.g., statements, conduct) remains admissible, expert opinions on capacity to intend are deemed unreliable and disruptive to the bifurcated process. The court also notes that the 'rebuttable presumption of intent' instruction, as used in this case, was not constitutionally impermissible when other evidence rebutting intent was allowed, distinguishing it from the conclusive presumption found unconstitutional in Hughes where all psychiatric evidence was excluded.
Dissenting - SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
Yes, the exclusion of all expert opinion evidence on the issue of an accused’s capacity to form specific intent is unconstitutional because it deprives a defendant of the right to counter state accusations with relevant and competent testimony, and the trial court should determine admissibility on a case-by-case basis. Justice Abrahamson argues that the majority’s rule, which excludes such evidence in both bifurcated and single-stage trials, directly conflicts with Hughes v. Mathews, which found such an evidentiary rule to be constitutionally infirm under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. She contends that the majority unduly prioritizes maintaining the bifurcated trial process over the defendant's right to an effective defense. Furthermore, she believes the jury instruction given in this case—that the law presumes a person intends the natural and probable consequences of their acts, which may be rebutted—is itself unconstitutional, citing her dissent in Muller v. State. For these reasons, she would reverse the judgment and remand the cause for a new trial.
Analysis:
This case significantly reaffirms Wisconsin's unique approach to the bifurcated trial system for criminal defendants pleading both 'not guilty' and 'not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.' By overruling Schimmel v. State and reinstating prior precedent, the court cements the bright-line rule that expert psychiatric testimony on a defendant's capacity to form specific intent is inadmissible during the guilt phase. This decision emphasizes the state's interest in maintaining the distinct purposes of the two trial phases—determining factual guilt versus determining criminal responsibility—and protects against jury confusion and potential undermining of the self-incrimination privilege. The ruling highlights judicial skepticism regarding the scientific reliability and probative value of psychiatric testimony in precisely determining specific intent, potentially influencing how courts approach 'diminished capacity' defenses in jurisdictions with similar bifurcated systems or concerns about psychiatric evidence.
