Steele v. Nagel
1965 Ida. LEXIS 396, 406 P.2d 805, 89 Idaho 522 (1965)
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Rule of Law:
An employer-employee relationship, combined with other circumstantial factors such as the employer's practice of leaving keys in company vehicles and retaining the employee after an unauthorized use, can create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employee had implied permission to use the vehicle, precluding summary judgment for the owner.
Facts:
- Virgil Clampett was employed by Nagel Beverage Company (Nagel) as a bottle sorter.
- Nagel owned several trucks and kept the keys in the ignitions at all times in the company parking lot, a fact that was common knowledge among employees.
- On August 28, 1961, after finishing work, Clampett took a Nagel pickup truck without seeking express permission from Mr. Nagel.
- Clampett told a fellow employee, a truck loader, to inform Mr. Nagel that he was using the truck.
- Clampett used the truck to drive two female acquaintances home, accompanied by another co-worker.
- While driving at a high rate of speed, Clampett lost control of the truck, struck a guardrail, and collided with a car driven by Dannard Steele.
- Clampett had previously driven the same truck on company business when accompanied by Mr. Nagel.
- After the accident, Nagel continued to employ Clampett.
Procedural Posture:
- Dannard Steele filed a lawsuit against Virgil Clampett and Nagel Beverage Company in an Idaho trial court for personal injuries and property damage.
- Nagel filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Clampett was operating the vehicle without their knowledge or consent.
- The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of Nagel.
- Steele, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Supreme Court of Idaho.
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Issue:
Does a genuine issue of material fact exist regarding an employer's implied permission for an employee to use a company vehicle for a personal errand, thus precluding summary judgment, when the employer-employee relationship existed, the employer habitually left keys in the vehicle, and the employer retained the employee after the accident?
Opinions:
Majority - McQuade, Chief Justice
Yes. A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding implied permission, which must be decided by a jury. Under Idaho Code § 49-1404, an owner is liable for the negligent operation of their vehicle by any person using it with their express or implied permission. The question of permission is a question of fact for the jury unless the evidence is so clear that only one conclusion is possible. Citing California precedent interpreting a nearly identical statute, the court held that an inference of permission may arise from the existence of an employer-employee relationship. This inference is strengthened by other factors present in this case: Nagel's practice of leaving keys in the trucks, which was known to all employees, and the fact that Nagel retained Clampett as an employee after the accident. These circumstances, taken together, prevent the court from ruling as a matter of law that no permission existed and require the issue to be presented to a trier of fact.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the doctrine of implied permission in the context of owner's liability statutes, particularly for employers. By holding that a combination of circumstantial evidence can create a triable issue of fact, the court makes it more difficult for vehicle owners to escape liability at the summary judgment stage. The ruling emphasizes that the relationship between the owner and operator is a paramount consideration and that an owner's conduct, such as lax key policies or post-accident retention of an employee, can be interpreted as evidence of implied consent. This precedent strengthens the position of plaintiffs injured by employees using company vehicles for personal errands, shifting the determination of permission from the judge to the jury in cases with similar facts.
